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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the motivations underpinning the mainstream news 
media have fundamentally changed in the 21 sl century. As such, the news is no 
longer best understood as a tool for propaganda or agenda setting; instead it 
seems that the news is only motivated by the flow of global network capitalism. 
The author contrasts the work of Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman with 
that of Gilles Deleuze. Chomsky and Herman's 'Propaganda Model' has been 
influential within the fields of media studies and popular culture. The 
'propaganda model' states that the concentration of ownership of the media has 
allowed the media elite to exert a disproportionate amount of influence over the 
mass media. Deleuze, on the other hand, regards the mass media as being yet 
another cog within the global capitalist mechanism, and is therefore separate 
from ideology or propaganda. The author proposes that 'propaganda' is no 
longer a sufficient word to describe the function of the news as terms like 
'propaganda' imply some form of national sovereignty or governmental influence. 
To highlight how the news has 'changed from an instrument of propaganda 
to an instrument of accumulation, the author compares and contrasts the· 
coverage of the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal with that of the Haditha Civilian 
Massacre. Although similar in nature, the author proposes that the Abu Ghraib 
Prison Scandal received a disproportionate amount of coverage within the 
mainstream press because of its exciting and sensational nature. 
Two War Scandals - Preface 
In April of 2004, accounts of torture, abuse, humiliation and homicide of 
the inmates at Abu Ghraib Prison began to surface. The story was accompanied 
by numerous photographs depicting acts of torture and abuse by US soldiers on 
Iraqi detainees. One of the more iconic images from the scandal depicted a 
hooded prisoner, with arms outstretched toward either side of the picture's 
border, with electrified wires running from his fingertips to his genitals. The 
pictures were gruesome, and gave a far harsher impression of the war in Iraq 
than that that was being shown on the evening news. Like most people, when I 
first saw the images I was shocked. Unlike most people I wasn't shocked so 
much by the acts themselves, but by the fact that they had been photographed. 
For me, the real horror of the images wasn't that such acts occur or that people 
are capable of committing such acts, but in the fact that the American soldiers 
depicted in the photographs seemed to be proud of what they were doing. Not 
unlike a hunter or a fisherman posing with the day's kill, each of the soldiers 
shown in the photographs seemed to glow with a sense of accomplishment. 
According to Susan Sontag, "for a long time - at lease six decades-
photographs have laid down the tracks of how important conflicts are judged and 
remembered" (Sontag 25). "The Western memory museum," continues Sontag, 
"is now mostly a visual one" (Sontag 25). To a staggering degree, people see 
and relate images from magazines, photographic essays and news broadcasts 
with world events. This association is in part due to the mantra of the news as a 
window onto the world. What impact then would the photographs from Abu 
Ghraib have on how Americans remember the war in Iraq? 
Sontag believed that the photos from Abu Ghraib would become the 
defining association for most Americans regarding the war in Iraq (Sontag 25). 
The images from Abu Ghraib would become as iconic as other images of conflict, 
such as those of a lone protestor standing in the way of a tank atTiananmen 
Square, and of a nude Vietnamese girl fleeing her burning village. However, 
Sontag could not have anticipated the degree of backlash the photographs would 
receive from both the public and the news media itself (Sontag 42). 
Whistleblowers and anyone willing to report on the story as it developed were 
treated as traitors. As Republican Senator James Inhofe testified, he was "more 
outraged by the outrage" over the photographs than by what the photographs 
show (Sontag 42). "These prisoners," Senator Inhofe explained, "they're not 
there for traffic violations ... they're murderers, they're terrorists, they're 
insurgents. Many of them have American blood on their hands, and here we're 
so concerned about the treatment of those individuals" (Sontag 42). Inhofe went 
on to say: it's the fault of "the media" for provoking and continuing to provoke 
further violence against Americans around the world (Sontag 42). Despite this 
backlash, the Abu Ghraib story received a fair amount of international attention. 
Duplicates of the images graced the covers of magazines and newspapers the 
world over. Despite the politics behind its publication, the media's stance on 
covering Abu Ghraib was clear - Abu Ghraib sells newspapers and pulls in 
ratings. 
But the world keeps turning, and it wasn't long until both the public and the 
media grew tired of Abu Ghraib. Despite an ongoing investigation and numerous 
dishonourable discharges, news of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal soon 
disappeared from the limelight And then, on November 19th , 2005, barely a year 
after news of the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal first hit newsstands America's 
campaign in Iraq was once again shaken by news of another scandal. It seemed 
that a small group of US Marines had been accused of shooting and killing 24 
Iraqi civilians in the city of Haditha. The mainstream news media's reaction to this 
new scandal was different from the first Instead of a great swell of images, 
discussions and inquiries, the news media was, for the most part, unmoved by 
news of Haditha. In fact, Haditha was so neglected that news of the story barely 
penetrated the surface of the American public sphere. 
First accounts of the Haditha story stated that the victims had been the 
unplanned casualties of a roadside bombing (Mcintyre 2006). These reports 
came directly from military officials attempting to pre-empt the possibility of a 
scandal similar to that of Abu Ghraib (Mcintyre 2006). However, images of what 
really transpired at Haditha soon came pouring in from locals and Iraqi news 
agencies. The collection of images depicted 24 civilians, all of whom were 
dressed in civilian clothing (Mcintyre 2006). They showed women and children 
bent over and leaning against a wall where they had been shot at close, others 
laying face down with their faces covered - one woman had even been shot in 
bed (Mcintyre 2006). All of the victims had clearly been shot - none appeared to 
have been killed by shrapnel as the Military had originally stated (Mcintyre 2006). 
What struck me as odd about the Haditha Massacre, and then later 
became the basis of my research, was that both the mainstream news media and 
the America public seemed equally complacent in dismissing the Haditha Civilian 
Massacre. At first' believed the lack of coverage of the Haditha Civilian 
Massacre lay in the fact that there was no comprehensive or sensational footage 
of the scandal. The news, especially televised news, relies heavily on images 
and video to sell stories, thus without images to drive a news story Haditha fell 
through the cracks of the mainstream headlines. But this scenario seemed 
unlikely considering the attention that Haditha had earned in the foreign press. 
For example, in the weeks following the events at Haditha, CNN World News had 
continual updates on the story as more and more details began to surface. I 
know this because I was in Europe from November through until January of 
2005/2006. I had been following the Haditha story closely while overseas and 
was shocked to find that none of my friends or colleagues had heard much, if 
anything, about the story or the stakes it involved. 
At first the lack of awareness regarding Haditha seemed like a great 
failure by the American news media. This was a monumental news story, one 
that I felt the press should have covered to the fullest degree. It wasn't until much 
later that I began to realize the news' inadequate coverage of the events at 
Haditha was actually the news working to its upmost capacity. 
For this study I have chosen the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal and the 
Haditha Civilian Massacre, because they are two very similar stories in nature 
and content, and seem to embody many of the limitations of the mainstream 
news media. I would like to explore the question; if both news stories are 
sensational in their very nature and depict American soldiers acting badly - why 
should one story demand so much more attention by the mainstream press than 
the other? 
I believe that the disproportionate amount of coverage that the Abu Ghraib 
Prison Scandal received compared to the Haditha Civilian Massacre points to a 
fundamental shift within the global news discourse with regards to the news' 
underlying motivation. I believe that the news is no longer best understood as a 
tool for propaganda or coercion. The problem with words such as 'propaganda' 
and 'bias' is that they imply that there is some form of government or sovereign 
state in place exerting its influence over the newsroom. Global news networks 
such as CNN are free from these types of pressures because they exist largely 
outside of the influence of anyone government or state. CNN, to use the 
example again, has offices and reporters stationed all over the world and 
broadcasts from thirty distinct countries, and growing. As such, it seems that the 
only rule that the global news empire is forced to abide by is the rule of global 
capitalism. Thus, I believe that the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal received such a 
disproportionate amount of coverage within the mainstream press because of its 
exciting and sensational nature. In such instances it seems that journalistic rigour 
runs only as deep as the news agencies bottom line. 
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Two War Scandals 2 
Introduction - News in the Age of Control 
In "Discipline and Punish" Michel Foucault describes the ways in which 
power became diffused across society. As Foucault describes, prior to the 1 th 
century the lines of power were dearly marked, stemming from some form of 
monarchical power. In the y.ears that would follow we witnessed the power of the 
monarchy dissipate and spread to powerful institutions such as the prison, the 
factory, the school, the family et cetera {Foucault 210). This aecentralization of 
power ushered society into a new era of control and confinement - power no 
longer stemmed from the judge's gavel or the police officer's baton but rather 
from your closest friends, co-workers and family members. 
In "panopticism" Foucault envisioned a model of control and confinement 
designed to understand the complex system of control and self-censorship that 
has taken hold within the West. It is a system wherein men and women become 
the wardens of their own lives, and the will and power of the state penetrates 
even the most personal institutions of our day-to-day lives (Foucault 200). Here 
Foucault is borrowing from British philosopher and thinker, Jeremy Bentham. 
Bentham envisioned a circular prison, placing a solitary guard atop a centralized 
tower (Foucault 200). Prrsoners were kept in small, backlit quarters - each facing 
the central tower (Foucault 200). They were made unaware, and kept separate 
from, other adjacent prisoners (Foucault 201). Bentham dubbed his prison, the 
Panopticon. The Panopticon worked on a very simple prem1se - the prisoners 
were made to feel as though they were constantly under surveillance. They 
could, however, never be ceftain of this as the lone guard was hidden from sight 
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within his post (Foucault 200). "Consequently," writes Foucault, "it does not 
matter who exercises power. .. any individual, taken almost at random, can 
operate the machine (the Panopticon): in the absence of the director, his family, 
his friends, his visitors, even his servants (Foucault 202). "Similarly," continues 
Foucault, "it does not matter what motive animates him: the curiosity of the 
indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for knowledge of a phikYsopher who 
wishes to visit this museum of human nature, or the perversity of those who .take 
pleasure in spying and punishing" (Foucault 202). In this way, the true power of 
the Panopticon lays in this anonymity. The prisoners of the Panopticon are ~eft 
totally vulnerable and visible to the invisible attendant's gaze. 
"But," as Foucault reminds us, "the Panopticon must not be understood as 
a 'dream building'" (Foucault 205). At its essence, the Panopticon "is the 
diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, 
abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a 
pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology 
that may and must be detached from any specific use" (Foucault 205). Foucault 
believes that the walls of the Panopticon have been blown out and expanded 
across the whole of society. Instead of a centralized guard post, we have closed-
circuit cameras, schoolmasters, neighbours, and any variety of observers, -to 
ensure that we are monitoring our behaviour. In contemporary society, the 
panoptic eye can be asserted and imposed over any formal institution: the prison, 
the hospital, the school, the asylum, the factory, or the family {Foucault 205). 
This realization enabled Foucault to distinguish two models for discipiine and the 
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governance of everyday life (Foucault 209). Just as in 'Bentham's first musings 
about the potential of the Panopticon within every nisciplinary society, eventually, 
the people become their own wardens, guards, and magistrates without the need 
for direct coercion (Foucault 210). This is to say, people become as invested in 
maintaining the position of the dominant as the elite are invested in maintaining 
the people's subjugation. This realization brought Foucault to his notion of the 
'disciplinary society' and the relationship between concepts of truth and power. 
In "Truth and Power," Foucault outlines several principles of the modern 
disciplinary society and establishes what he calls the "political economy of truth 
(Foucault, "Truth and Power" 208). According to Foucault, truth is never outside 
of power (Foucault 208). There is no absolu·te truth outside of our societal, 
institutional miasma. As Foucault writes, "there is a baWe for truth ... one that 
ultimately determines what relationships, what knowledge, and what forms of 
power become naturalized within society" (Foucault 209). Within a disciplinary 
society truth can be used almost synonymously with power and concepts of right 
and wrong. As people move throughout the various institutions that govern 
society, power often dictates truth. Within the classroom, for example, the power 
of the instructor dictates what types of information cons·titute knowledge. If a 
child's behaviour or aptitude deviates from the teacher's norm, the child will be 
reprimanded and penalized. The child can even be held back and alienated from 
their peers if his or her behaviour does not align within the teacher's marker of 
acceptable deviation. 
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The same kind of institutional reprimands can be seen in the newsroom. 
As I will later discuss in greater detail, the hierarchies and bureaucracies that 
determine what make it to camera or print have been well documented by 
scholars and analysts of the news media. As Eric Louw reminds us, there is an 
institutional bias within all newsrooms which are negotiated at every level of the 
production of an evening news cast (Louw 69). There are templates to follow, 
various editors and hiring and firing committees to name a few. First and 
foremost, however, there is an almost invisible, international precedent within the 
news industry dictating a story's "newsworthyness" (Louw 69). Only those stories 
which meet the criteria to be considered news worthy, a term that has become 
almost synonymous with sensational,and therefore sure to generate 
viewership/readership, will make it to print or air. Similarly, only those journalists, 
columnists, reporters and anchors that can abide by these rules will rise to the 
top of the news game and reach a national or international audience. 
Through Foucault's eyes the news then is just another institution amongst 
the myriad of similar institutions that govern society's norms. Like the school the 
church, the factory and the prison, the news is arranged as a strict hierarchy, with 
the editors at the top and the journalists and reporters closer to the bottom. As in 
Panopticism, each player organizes his or her behaviour based upon the desire 
to do weiland succeed with the hopes of someday advancing up the ladder or, 
conversely, out of fear of being penalized or fired. As in all institutions within the 
disciplinary society, eventually the objects of oppression and subjugation are 
made to be superfluous and eventually the prison guards, so to speak, can be 
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removed from the tower. The prisoners will thereafter auto-regulate their actions 
and beliefs out of habit. 
Foucault's perceptions of power and control deviate from many of his 
contemporaries, such as Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman. 
Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media, Chomsky and 
Herman spoke of the power that the United States Administration has over 
setting the agenda for various intuitiOns, including mainstream news agencies. ~n 
the words of Chomsky and Herman, "the mass media serve as a system for 
communicating messages and symbols to the general populace ... it is their 
function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the 
values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the 
institutional structures of the larger society" {Chomsky and Herman 1). Instead of 
institutions like the school, the hospital or the barracks shaping people's 
behaviour and creating norms within society, Chomsky and Herman suggest that, 
in addition to these institutions, the media plays a significant role in creating 
needs and manufacturing common sense. The "propaganda model" put forth by 
Chomsky and Herman focuses on the inequality of wealth and power between 
the media-rich and the media-poor, and its corresponding effects on society 
(Chomsky and Herman 2). Because of this inequality of access, the elite are able 
to naturalize certain relationships and force their own agenda's onto society. In 
terms of the mainstream news media, "the elite domination of the media and 
marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occurs 
so naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity 
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and goodwill, are able to convince themselv€s that they choose and interpret the 
news 'objectively'" (Chomsky and Herman 2). Under this model, the news 
becomes transformed into a site for propaganda and the reinforcement of the 
ruling class values. 
It seems to me that the vast majority of scholarly works published about 
news production and the media in general have been written from within this 
Syndicalist, Chomskian perspective. Eric Louw, for example, has worked very 
hard to demonstrate how institutional pressures, both from within a news agency 
and outside it, work to regulate and corrupt the information that makes it to print 
or broadcast (Louw 157). While still valid, I believe the problems undercutting the 
news media as an instrument of subjugation and propaganda cannot be 
explained as simply as a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
These terms are excellent for understanding subjectivity and locality, but seem 
obsolete when you consider the vast global networks involved in producing your 
typical newscast. The news is not local. Even local news broadcasts rely heavily 
on news agencies, such as Reuters or the Associated Press,for content. The 
concept of locality in news is further complicated by the emergence of the 
Internet as a legitimate and mainstream source of news and information. All of 
these channels exist outside of national borders and are, to a large extent, 
immune to governmental pressures. Rather, the market tends to dictate form and 
regulation within the mainstream news industry. 
In his essay, "Control and Becoming," Gilles Oeleuze outlines the 
complications of a society ruled by global capital. Oeleuze's opinions differ 
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greatly from many of his contemporaries; Chomsky being among the most 
notable. For Deleuze, the issue is not about who has control and what agendas 
are being served and to what ends, instead he believes that the modes of 
reproduction have become so engrained within contemporary capitalist sodety 
that there is no end to their system of perpetuation in sight. According to 
Deleuze, within a "Control Society," nearly every facet of me is working in tandem 
with one another to ensure that the status quo is maintained '(Oeleuze 181). 
Similarly to Foucault's notion of discourse, Deleuze's society of control will 
continue to operate and expand without guidance or formal leadership. The path 
of history is therefore not dictated by ideology so much as it is by the systems of 
control. In Deleuze's society of control the primary tool for glooal confinement is 
capitalism (Deleuze 172). Global network capitalism becomes the universal 
mode of corralling and ordering all societies despite language, custom or national 
boundaries. As Deleuze writes, "in capitalism only one thing is universal, the 
market" (Deleuze 172). Deleuze continues, "there's no universal state, precisely 
because there's a universal market of which states are the centers, the trading 
floors" (Deleuze 172). Deleuze believes that the true governing body of global 
affairs has little to do with ideology or hegemony 1, but rather that politics and 
economics are inseparable aspects of each other. 
Within the context of the news, news stories and global events are 
simplified and given attention only to the extent that they ,can stimUlate 
viewership and generate advertising revenue. It is easy to see how an event 
I Hegemony, a theoretical concept used to describe the domination of one social group over another. Within 
capitalist society, the dominant group is best understood as the wealthy or power elite. 
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such as Abu Ghraib oould garnish the extent of the attention it did. Abu Ghraib 
was born out of sensationalism - it had all the sex and virnence of a Jerry 
Bruckheimer movie and was accompanied by play-by-play photographs. The 
aftermath of the scandal, however, did not receive the same degree of attention. 
It seems that the court proceedings and sentencing were not nearly as 
newsworthy as the scandal itself. Now, Lynndie England, a woman prominently 
and infamously depicted in the Abu Ghraib photographs, is a househoid name 
though without the same level of infamy had her trial been .covered by the 24-
hour news networks. Instead, England and her exploits have been canonized 
within popular culture by university fraternHies and various online blogs. 'Doing 
the Lynndie2, (striking a pose while holding a lit cigarette in your mouth and 
pointing away enthusiastically), is common-place at most university initiation and 
degradation ceremonies. 
On the other hand, the tragedy at Haditha, which saw 24 Iraqi civilians 
murdered at the hands of a small group of American soldiers, was buried within 
the mainstream news. Haditha did not demand the same level of sensationalism 
because the action had failed to be photographed. In the end, we were left with a 
scenario wherein justice and journalistic rigour ran only as deep as the paper or 
news affiliate's bottom line. The difference highlights, as Deleuze said, how "a 
concern for human rights shouldn't lead us to extol the 'joys' of the liberal 
capitalism of which they're an integral part" (Deleuze 172-3). And so, instead of a 
romanticised concept of how the news and journalism ought to be, we are left 
2 For detailed and graphic examples of "doing a Lynndie," or "striking a Lynndie" see 
http://badgas.co.ukIlynndie/ 
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with a multitude of distractions to ensure that the mechanisms of global 
capitalism continue unencumbered. 
In chapter one I will present a case for the news as a tool for propaganda. 
This is an old rendition of a common story, but one that offers insight into the 
formal organization of the news. Here I will contrast the reality of the institutional 
framework of the news and the news aesthetic with the romanticized "window 
onto the world" rhetoric. In Chapter two I will look more closely at the tragedies at 
Haditha and Abu Ghraib and attempt to demonstrate that the news functions not 
only as a sight for propaganda, but a~so how it embodies many of the markers 
and symptoms of Deleuze's society of control. Finally, in chapter three I will ~ook 
outside of the mechanisms of the mainstream media and assess the Internet and 
desktop journalism's potential for disruption. 
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Popular Paradoxes 
There is a whole process of checks and balances that must be weighed 
before a cultural product can be considered part of popu1ar culture. Typically, 
these qualifications are divided by questions of which rung of society the object 
d'art originated. One school of thought follows that in order to be part of the 
popular an object d'art must originate from within the working classes. This 
definition of popular culture opposes the notion that what is popular, that is, that 
which is produced for a mass audience, is popular cul1ure. Frankfurt school 
thinkers such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, offer an alternative to 
this definition. Adorno and Horkheimer propose that there is a cultural spectrum, 
with high/elite culture at one end and low/popular culture at the other. As Adorno 
and Horkheimer describe, the former "allowed the subscriber to play the role of 
subject. .. the latter turns all participants into listeners and authoritatively subjects 
them to broadcast programs which are all exactly the same"{Adorno and 
Horkheimer 72). In the eyes of Adorno and Horkheimer, what is popular is 
insuperably connected to the masses (Adorno and Horkheirner 32). Under this 
definition popular culture is produced by the media elite in 'Order to appeal to the 
lowest common denominator and thus attract the .greatest number of advertisers. 
These contrasting definitions of popular culture create a grey zone that 
ensnares all of those cultural products which do not easily fall into either 
category. While it is easy to fit ripped jeans or folk music into the proletariat 
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model, just as it is easy for the Frankfurt school to condemn sitcoms and pop-
music for being too homogenous, the news presents a mucn more difficult~ase. 
The televised news media by no means originate within the working classes. 
Likewise, the news does not easily fit along side the likes of Brittany Spears, 
Lindsay Lohan and Matthew McConaughey movies. In this introduction I aim to 
give a brief overview of some of the paradoxes of popular culture. Ultimately, I 
hope to show that the televised news industry is situated somewhere within the 
grey area of popular culture, neither belonging to the working classes, nor part of 
the homogenized, anaesthetizing "pap" of the cultural industry, but part of 
popular culture nonetheless. 
What is Popular? 
Classic definitions of popular culture tend to situate the origins of popular 
culture within the subordinate classes {Fiske 4). Here, popular culture is the 
answer to, or antithesis of, the dominant culture. "Popular Culture," as John Fiske 
writes, "is the culture of the subordinated and disempowered and thus bears 
within it signs of power relations, traces of the forces .of domination and 
subordination that are central to our social system and therefore to our social 
experience" (Fiske 4). Under this definition popular cultumis aiways reactionary. 
The subordinate classes, which do not have access to the means of production, 
create meaning along the lines of displacement, disfigurement, detournement 
and resistance. The poor use what is readily available to them in order t.o create 
their own goods and systems of meaning. However, this definition of popular 
culture is limited because it generalizes society into the elite and the poor - those 
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who produce culture and those whom act~vely resist the culture being imposed 
on them. While this is true to a certain extent, in most(;ases the lines of' 
separation between the haves and the have-nots are not so rigid. There will 
always be those elements which bind and articulate these subsets to their parent 
culture (Bennett106). 
As Andy Bennett explained in "Subcultures 'Or Neotribes?" a person 
cannot exclusively exist within a"Sub-cultural, r.eactionary social sphere. 
Therefore, "those groupings traditionally theoriz.ed as coherent subcultures are 
better understood as temporal gatherings characterized by fluid boundaries and 
floating memberships" (Bennett 106). Inevitably, subaltern popular cuiture forms 
and objects d'art are discovered, castrated and worked back into the fold of 
mainstream society. The channel of least resistance through which subaltern 
aesthetics tend to find their way back into society is commerce. 
In Understanding Popular Culture, John Fiske gives a detailed account of 
the schizophrenic relationship between subcultures and commerce. As Fiske 
writes, "the relationship between popular culture and the forces of commerce and 
profit is highly problematic" (Fiske 10). Fiske uses the examp1e of torn blue jeans, 
the great symbol of youth rebellion, rock and roll and the working class, as his 
primary case study for understanding this contradiction. Aocording to Fiske, blue 
jeans hold a special place within western sodety, both as a <;ommodity and as an 
object of popular culture (Fiske 10). The jeans themselves, despite their class, 
social and cultural baggage, are a relatively benign cultural product - they are a 
composite of dyed cotton and thread, manufactur.ed en masse for a mass 
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audience. But when they are purchased, worn and defaced they are made 
unique and signify on a completely different level (Fiske 10). "At the simplest 
level," writes Fiske, torn blue jeans are an "example of a user not simply 
consuming a commodity but reworking it, treating it not as a complete object to 
be accepted passively, but as a cultural resource to be used" {Fiske 10). Popular 
culture becomes a form of resistance as the proletariat disrupt the messages of 
the dominant culture, and transform mass objects into personal possessions. 
Other cultural theorists, such as Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 
approach popular culture with far less romanticism. For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
all culture outside of the most elite social spheres has been seized and made 
ruin by the gleaming light of capitalism. As Adorno and Horkheimer write, "the 
striking unity of microcosm and macrocosm presents men with a model of their 
culture: false identity of the general and the particular" (Adorno and Horkheimer 
32). "Under monopoly," continues Adorno and Horkheimer, "all mass culture is 
identical, and the lines of its artificial framework begin to show through" (Adorno 
and Horkheimer 32). Working-class music, folk-art and reclamations are all part 
of the broader capitalist driven culture industry because they are saturated, and 
thus tainted, by the same homogenized modes of production. From the Frankfurt 
School approach, the mainstream news is part of the popular because it is 
inevitably corrupted by pressures of capitalism. As I will discuss in .greater detail 
in Chapter 1, journalists, editors and on-scr€en reporters are routinely pressured 
to conform to the tyranny of the lowest common denominator in order to provide 
advertisers access to the greatest audience possible {Louw 1-61). 
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The News as Popular Culture 
So far we are left with a vision of popular culture as belonging to the 
working classes and the product of the laissez-faire, market driven, mainstream 
media elite. One originating from the top and the other belonging to the bottom. 
Neither definition is right just as neither definition can be whoUy wrong. The 
mainstream news media prov.es both definitions to be true, but incomplete. On 
one hand, the news has always "be~onged" to the working classes, ,dating back to 
the origins of tabloid news and the Yellow Press. The Yellow 'Press reached its 
peak in popularity by early 190'Os (Becker 293). At this time, newspapers rarely 
published photos as they were s.een as being too sensational and therefore 
beneath the high standards of professional journalism (Becker 293). The Yellow 
Press, on the other hand, was a much more visual news publication. Editors of 
the Yellow Press frequently used lithographs, cartoons and included dramatic re-
enactments of court procedures and other major news events. This not -only 
added a degree of sensationalism to the Yellow Pr.ess, but it also made it an 
immediate hit with the largely illiterate working-class {Becker 293). At present, 
the news media is inundated with photography, illustrations and photo-essays. 
The line separating hard journalism and the printed image has vanished from the 
newsroom, and the development of newer, faster and more accessible 
technologies has created the demand for even grittier, raunchier, more 
sensational images. There is still a hierarchy amongst news journals, particularly 
separating tabloid journalism from hard news, but this separation has more to do 
with content and reputation than the medium itself. In Canada, The National Post 
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and the Toronto Star have a much more credible reputation than say Hello 
Magazine·(an international weekly celebrity tabloid featuring a Canadian edition). 
Nevertheless, it seems that the distance betwe·en the tabloid press and the 
legitimate press is shrinking - even the biggest names in the legitimate news 
business, CNN and BBC World News for instance, have a celebrity gossip 
column and broadcast content. Thus, saying that the '~news" beiongs exclusively 
to the elite and is in some way removed from the popular, or vice versa, becomes 
problematic. 
The second way the news has breached the lexicon of popular culture is 
in the crystallization of the news aesthetic. Whether in print, radio or television, 
the news has a very strict format, which all players must adhere to (Morse 57). 
This "format" has created a working template for bloggers and would-be-
reporters to produce their own content in print, or online. As Michael Strangelove 
cites, as of 2003 there were more than 500,000 online personal news and 
weblogs; many of which sported video content and audio files (Strangelove 184). 
Aside from a few aesthetic and budgetary limitations, these weblogs and vlogs 
were virtually indistinguishable from their mainstream counterparts. Much of the 
content online and from the margins was a mere carbon copy of the mainstream 
news media. Still, others used the web to share their unique stories and 
perspectives. These weblogs are produced in reaction against and to the 
mainstream news medium. This is an important aspect of online alternative 
media, not only because it indicates that the spread of information is opening up 
and becoming more democratic and accessible online, but it also indicates the 
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fluidity of the news medium. We see then that the news is not simply a tool of the 
elite to be viewed passively and regurgitated later; it is also a malleable style and 
aesthetic to be negotiated and played with by the subordinate classes. Like 
Fiske's torn blue jeans, the news then becomes an example of "a user not simply 
consuming a commodity but reworking it, treating it not as a complete object to 
be accepted passively, but as a cultural resource to be used" (Fiske 10). 
Therefore, commodities become the blank tablet through which popular culture is 
written. 
Two War Scandals ~ 8 
Chapter 1: The News Monolith 
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Having Control, Saving Face and the Nightly News 
"Meaning," as an abstract and figurative concept, is ta~r<en fer granted 
nearly as 'Often as are the sources and inventors 'Of "meaning." Even abeve 
netiens 'Of signs, signifiers and signified; meaning and meaning-making playa 
fundamental role in hew pewer relatiens arel€arned, taught and reproduced from 
persen te person, generatien te generation and frem culture te .culttlre. As Eric 
Leuw writes, auther 'Of The Media and Cultural Productien, "we are mental 
beings ... ultimately the human capacity for language, sharing and 
cemprehensien invelves an ability t'O make meaning, that is we are able te take in 
perceptiens, process them, cemprehend them and then share them with ethers" 
(Leuw 1). Leuw's descriptien 'Of the human {jesire te make and share meaning, at 
least in this instance, seems very crass. After all, in the wake 'Of the twenty-feur-
heur-seven-day-a-week news network, all peep Ie's capacity fer making and 
sharing meaning is not exactly equal. 
The pelitics fer understanding, deciphering and sharing meaning are 
-
embedded within a broader system of power. In an interview cenducted by 
Alessandro Fentana and Pasquale Pasquino, Michel Foucault gives insights inte 
what he referred te as "the pelitical economy 'Of truth" (Feucault 208). 'Truth," 
accerding te Feucault, "isn't outside pewer" {Feucault 208). This is tD say that, 
there is ne abselute truth 'Outside 'Of our secial, institutional miasma. Rather, "truth 
is a thing 'Of this werld: it is produced only by virtue of multi~e ferms{)f 
censtraint. .. and it induces re.guJar effects 'Of pewer" (Foucault .208). Accerding te 
Feucauft, "each society has its regime 'Of truth, its 'general pelitics' .of truth: that 
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is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true" {Foucauit 
209). The single most important aspect of this discussj.on that Foucault touches 
on is the connection between truth and power. "There is a battle 'for truth,'" writes 
Foucault (Foucault 209), one that ultimately determines what relationships, what 
knowledge and what forms of power become naturalized within society {Foucault 
209). "Truth" is then inseparable from both power and those who own power -
"'truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and 
sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. .. a regime 
of truth" (Foucault 209). In the battle for truth and power in the 21 st Century, the 
mainstream news media have a sizeable advantage over the individual. In this 
respect, the news can be seen as the quintessential apparatus through which 
power and information are disseminated to the public. The extensive global 
networks that the major news organizations have access to allow the producers 
and financiers of such programs to create a coherent and {relatively) 
unchallenged vision of the world. This is not to say that what is presernedon the 
news is a bold-faced lie, but it would be grossly irresponsib~e to assume that 
these reports are completely "honest," "unbiased" or "objective." These 
synonyms for truth are especially problematic when you consider that the forum 
for negotiating these terms has been written by the very institutions that claim to 
uphold them. 
In this chapter I will address some of the major ideological issues 
underpinning the news discourse. I hope to demonstrate that the news is not as 
benign as its rhetoric would have us believe. Above all, I want to show that the 
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news is a tangible and malleable site of cultural production; a site that is as open 
to, and subject to, the same kinds 'of manipulation and ,control as are other sites 
of popular culture. This is not to say that the news is inherently wicked - I wish to 
challenge the assumption that the news is an "objective" window to or "mirror" of 
reality. There are two areas of the news that I will be focusing on. First I will 
discuss the news' potential as a tool for political propaganda, and hopefully 
demonstrate how the "propaganda model" for understanding news production 
has become somewhat outdated. Secondly, I will begin my discussion of the 
news as it appears today at the forefront<>f global {;ontrol by examining the 
aesthetic and methodological elements that underpin the news industry. 
Manufacturing Informed Consent 
In Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media, 
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky discuss the ideological impact that the 
mainstream news media has on American society. According to Chomsky and 
Herman, "the media serve, and propagandize, on behalfof, the powerful societal 
interests that control and finance them"{Herman and Chomsky XI). Under 
Chomsky and Herman's "propaganda model," the news in all of its material 
manifestations functions to uphold the beliefs and agenda of a concentrated few, 
while simultaneously restricting thought, debate and the possibility of dissent. 
The level of coercion executed by the state is not articUlated in overt ways, but is 
instead shaped through its repetition acr{)ss the news discourse as a who~e. 
What may appear to be a variety of ,different voices exercising a variety of 
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different opinions on any giv~n subject is often a singular voice or opinion: 
disguised through r:epetition and its widespread pubHcation. 
As the name suggests, Chomsky's "propaganda model" can been used to 
explain how the interests of a concentrated few can become naturalized within 
society until they become generally accepted as the interests of many. In this 
way, the reality depicted by the news can be shown to reflect, and even mirror, 
the specific interests of the producers and financiers of a news pubHcation. In 
one such example, Chomsky and Herman outline a distinction in the media's 
treatment of victims of enemy states, versus victims within one of the US's "client 
states." 
Despite the media's claim to objectivity, a tangible distinction emerges 
between such states creating what Chomsky and Herman referred to as "worthy 
and unworthy victims" (Chomsky and Herman XIX). Worthy victims, those victims 
who are either clients of or the benefactors of the United States, receive much 
more gracious attention by the American media than those states which are 
unfriendly, or simply do not hold any immediate value to the US. As Choms·ky 
and Herman describe, "the bias is politically advantageous to US policy-makers, 
for focusing on victims of enemy states shows those states to be wicked and 
deserving of US hostility; while ignoring US and client-state victims allows 
ongoing US policies to proceed more easily, unburdened by the interference of 
concern over the politically inconvenient victims" {Chomsky and Herman XX). 
This distinction has had -some real and gaugeable effects on public opinion 
concerning foreign policy: '"Genocide,''' as Chomsky and Herman write, "is an 
Two War Scandals 23 
invidious word that officials apply r-eadily t.o cases of victimization in enemy 
states, but rarely, if ever, to similar or worse cases of victimization by the United 
States itself or allied regimes" (Chomsky and Herman XX). One example of this 
kind of preferential treatment is the US news coverage of Saddam Hussein in the 
1990s compared with that of Turkey. Both Iraq and Turkey underwent a similar 
campaign to eradicate their Kurdish populations but only one nation was backed 
by the United States. "Turkey's treatment of its Kurds was in no way less 
murderous than Iraq's treatment of Iraqi Kur.as," but as far as US political officials 
and analysts were concerned, "Turkey only 'r:epresses,' while Iraq engages in 
'genocide'" (Chomsky and Herman XX). 
Abu Ghraib is such an interesting example because it demonstrates this 
bias within a single story. In the case of Abu Ghraib, what began as a public 
outcry against a US-led torture exercise was transformed and retold as the 
unquestionable right of the US to defend itself (Sontag 42). Journalism and 
objectivity were seemingly tossed aside in order to construct a narrative around 
Abu Ghraib that would both subdue dissent by shifting the blame away from the 
Bush Administration, and restore public trust in their war effort. In "Regarding the 
Torture of Others," Susan Sontag discusses the nature of the pictures ,that were 
leaked from Abu Ghraib. For Sontag, what is terrifying about the photographs is 
not in what the images depicted but in the fact that the photographs were taken 
in the first place. Through Sontag's eyes, the pictures from Abu Ghraib were not 
tragic because of what was being done (hooded prisoners being threatened with 
electrocution and humiliation), but because of how dose1y the images mirrored 
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American life. The "photographs are us," exclaimed Sontag, because it is 
impossible to separate the images from American culture. This, combined with 
the specific policies and realities the Bush Administration has invested itself in, 
has made events like Abu Ghraib not only plausible, but likely. 
This realization by the American media, at least at the mythological1evel 
of which Sontag was speaking is perhaps why the drastic rewrite of Abu Ghraib 
was undertaken. Before the spiral of self-condemnation and ill-sentiments 
towards America's war effort could take off at home, the media stepped in to do 
what it could to erase the scar that the Abu Ghraib scandal had left on the face of 
America. Before the finger of blame could be pointed at the Administration or at 
the policy-makers responsible for Abu Ghraib, the narrative being promoted by 
the media centered on the responsibility of the individual actors stationed at Abu 
Ghraib. 
The ease with which Abu Ghraib was transformed f.rom rampant human 
rights violation to a plausible defence strategy is shocking, but not surprising. To 
have covered Abu Ghraib in any way that would have hindered America's war 
effort or damaged the reputation of the Administration or the military, would have 
been like signing one's own death warrant. The news media are as reliant on 
state institutions, as state institutions ar-e reliant on the news media. Surprisingly, 
however, this mutual dependency could be the most overt and honest aspect of 
the media's great propaganda-fagade. Through a series of simple and widely 
publicized acquisitions the US military became the single 9reatest contributor to 
the news industry. In "Watch out Dick Tracy!," DeeDee Halleck outlines how this 
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takeover came to be. "From the cereal box to the TV set," writes Halleck, "too 
military is a part of everyday life in the United States" {HaJ-leck 211). And the 
merger between RCA and General Electric has only made more obvious the 
kinds of "symbiosis that the military has had from the beginning with the major 
media corporations" (Halleck 211). GE and RCA have been two of the US 
military's largest contractors since before the Second World War. NBC was a 
subsidiary of RCA and is now, thanks to GE's recent acqutsition, a large 'part of 
the "megamilitary corporation" the merger created (Hal'leck 211). Thus, oneef 
America's largest names in news became a direct beneficiary of America's 
industrial mi1itary complex. 
The collusion between the military and the major media networks has 
always existed. Even under the most benign motivations, the news has a~ways 
been dependent on the military. This is especially true during times of war. 
During wartime, it is not unimaginable to see how milit8ry officiats become active 
participants in the hiring/firing cycle of the newsroom. This is all part of the US 
military's larger shift towards calculated, Public Relation-ized warfare. "By 1990," 
writes Louw, "the US military had developed a new model of media-ized warfare 
in which public relations and psy-ops were central features of the planning and 
execution of the war" (Louw 177). The first Gulf War was organized and set-up 
as a tactical media operation requiring extensive,long-term p~anning and 
hegemonic strategizing. As Louw writes, "once military dep10yment began, the 
media were corralled and managed ... Journalists were formed into 'pools' far 
removed from the battlefront, where military PHs ,could feed them information" 
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(Louw 178). Similar "pooling" techniques are used in America's current campaign 
in the Middle East. As before, journalists are only granted access to events that 
are strictly controlled. Censorship is achieved through limiting access to reporters 
and by carefully monitoring which reporters have access to what information. As 
a result, military officials have almost direct control ov,er which journalists get 
published and even promoted. 
This is especially problematic when you consider how the Abu Ghraib 
Prison scandal was first leaked in the US. The scandal was not the result of 
tireless s~euthing on the part of any particular reporter or news agency, but 
instead came from the arrogance of the soldiers stationed in Iraq. One of the 
soldiers had passed on copies of the photos t'O a friend looking for scenic shots 
of his stay in Iraq. The photos were later leaked to world news agencies and 
disseminated around the world via email. As Dora Apel explains in "Torture 
Culture, Lynching Photographs and the Images of Abu Ghraib," the photos were 
originally intended for use as polit~cal blackmail (Apel 90). As 'One government 
consultant admitted, "the purpose of the photographs was to create an army of 
informants, people you could insert back into the population" (Ape I 90). This 
would explain why former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld's, initial 
reaction to the photographs was not one of surprise or shock, but anger that the 
photos had gotten out (Apel 91). He immediately banned soldiers stationed in 
Iraq prisons from carrying cameras. 
Rumsfeld's actions demonstrate the fear that the US military have of 
uncensored, unmediated information. They are fully aware that if their latest war 
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in the Middle East is not careful·ly Public Relation-ized, they stand to lose the 
support of the American population. 
In both Chomsky and Herman's example and in Sontag's account of the 
Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, the US Administration used its considerable power 
and influence to directly affect how news stories were covered and treated by the 
media. In one example, US allies were treated much more favourably than non-
allies, despite similarities in bad behaviour. In the case of Abu Ghraib, 
responsibility for blatant human rights violations was placed on a series of 
individual actors, with little attention being paid to the policies and inactions that 
made it all possible. According to Chomsky and Herman, this .propagandizing of 
the media is only made possible by the careful management of access to 
information of world events. In maintaining a monopoly of vision over global 
events, the media rich are able to exude a great degree of control and influence 
over the media poor. However, Chomsky and Herman's position is only valid so 
long as news is being produced from within a closed and heavily striated space. 
For all of Chomsky and Herman's brilliance, their propaganda model is 
contingent on the belief that there is some great ideologue or hegemonic elite, or 
alliance of elites, out there trying to impose their wi11 onto the fest 'Of society. 
Prisons, barracks, schools and hospitals are excellent examples of such dosed 
spaces where ideology and ideoiogical conformity are still possible, but as 
Deleuze reminds us, these spaces of confinement are being broken down 
(Deleuze 174). According to Deleuze, the old sites of confinement are collapsing 
"because they're fighting a losing battle ... We're moving towards control societies 
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that no 10nger operate by confining people but through contro/e {Jontinu3 and 
instant communication" (Deleuze 174). In the foHowingiJassage, I wiH show how 
this new global ordering machine has affected the ways in which news is 
produced and circulated by highlighting how the news has shifted from a dosed 
space comprised of individuals to a global network of dividuated "drudges." 
The Media Masquerade 
In an interview with Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze discusses, among other 
things, the lines of flight in which capitalist society is constant1y being drawn. 
There is a departure here between the writings of Deleuze and Foucault. Where 
Foucault maintained that sodety was organized around the principles of 
confinement and the various hierarchies embedded within institutions, Deteuze 
believes that capitalist society has outgrown these machines of confinement and 
has been transformed into something much more fluid {Oeleuze 172). For 
Deleuze, disciplinary societies, such as those described by FoucauU, "operate by 
organizing major sites of confinement" (Deleuze 177). Deleuze continues, within 
such societies "individuals are always going from "one dosed site to another, 
each with its own laws: first of all the family, then school, then the bafracks, then 
the factory, hospital from time to time, maybe prison"{De~euze 177). But these 
sites of confinement are breaking down; they are being emdedt.o make way for 
the new global ordering machine - the society of control (De1euze 178). 
3 Control continu, literally translates to continuous control. 
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As Deleuze describes, "the various p{acements or sites of confinement 
through which individuals pass are independent variables: we're supposed to 
start all over again each time, and although all of these sites have a common 
language, it's analogical" {Deleuze 178). "The various forms of control," writes 
Deleuze, "are inseparable var~ations, forming a system of varying geometry 
whose language is digital4" (Deleuze 178). In other words, the "molds" and 
institutions (the family, the factoryet <:etera) are {)eing eroded to make way 'lor a 
system whose only ordering mechanism is susceptible to thenuidity of 
information and currency. This sentiment is evident when Deleuze writes, "in 
capitalism only one thing is universal, the market. .. there's no universal state, 
precisely because there's a universal market of which states are the centers, the 
trading floors" (Deleuze 172). Within the boundaries of such a schizophrenics 
state, any underlying moral compass is dictated and driven by whatever path 
offers the least amount of resistance to the accumulation of capital and other 
gains. Under this model, it becomes evident that, today, the market has more 
control over foreign policy; distinctions between right and wrong, friend and foe, 
than any formal government body or state. In practical terms, "accountability" 
becomes a floating term that is separate from any real sense of consequence 
(Deleuze 180). We are surrounded by ciphers and figureheads, which can be 
4 Deleuze is writing about the role of the worker within late 20th century capitalism. Rather than men being 
forced to fit within certain molds and roles, he regarded the new worker as a changeling. As Deleuze 
writes, "controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment 
to the next" (Deleuze 197). 
5 Here I am referring to the opposing natures of seemingly all 'Capitalist states. The puB between the need 
for sovereignty and identity and need to now within global capital markets 
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disposed of or substituted in, at a moment's 110tice - "dividuals" rather than 
"individuals" . 
This reality is made especially evklent within the televised news discourse. 
Within the televised news, reporters and anchors are disposed of with as little as 
a single line of dialogue. As the viewer, we are constantly being asked to stay 
tuned and shift our attention to the next talking head. So long as his -position in 
front of the screen falls within the familiar lines and his mode and delivery are 
consistent with the voice that preceded it, the audience seems complacent to 
accept his credibility. The author and authority, here, become inverted - the 
news program or network itself becomes the sole authority.figure. Those 
performing the act of reporting are simply following a pre-described rormat and 
style. As a result, it is becoming difficult to discuss the news in terms of 
confinement and propaganda. Individuality and ideology seem to be disappearing 
from the newsroom, and what we are left with is an unevenly dispersed cluster of 
networks. The consequences of this system are that notions of accountability and 
objectivity have been replaced by an ever present, all encompassing news 
aesthetic. 
I will continue here by examining the ways in whtch the news has been 
transformed from an institution comprised of individuals and ideologies into a 
global network of control. Key to this idea is the notion that the news is being 
transformed from a monolithic whole into a network of control. The difference is 
that the news is no longer powered by individuals or idooogies, but rather by a 
boundless format or aesthetic. Here the news becomes powered by "ciphers" 
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and "actors" rather than by individuals or experts. By "cipher," I am referring to 
the comptex computing language, based on a key or a predetermined set of 
rules, images or symbols. These ciphers can be inserted by programmers to 
execute a predetermined set of commands or rules. When the term is used to 
describe a person or group of persons, cipher denotes a person or thing of lit·tie 
value or importance: a non-person. According to Deleuze, the further into "Control 
society moves the harder it becomes to retain ones individuality {Oeteuze 172). 
The reason behind this loss of individuality is due to the fact that the market 
demands it of us {Deleuze 179). The market no longer propagates itself based on 
institutions or "Confinement, but instead insists that we become autonomous,and 
fluid - like money. 
In "The Television News Personality and Credibility," Margaret Morse 
stresses that "in order to function as a cohesive social force, the news must 
above all be worthy of belief' (Morse 56). Key to this is the presentation of the 
news anchor or reporter as an impartial mediator of the daily news. As Morse 
describes, in order to meet these new mandates, the press, radio and televised 
news broadcasts underwent drastic tfansformations that privileged distance and 
methodological objectivity above authorship (Morse 56). This meant that the 
news' credibility was no longer being derived from the expertise of the reporter or 
from the reputation of the particular news publication - news began to derive its 
credentials from the news itself (Morse 56). As Morse writes, at some point print, 
radio and television "developed a mode of narration, a style, and content which 
suppressed the subjective origin of the news 'story' in fav.our of a 'reality' which 
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seemed to possess a voice of its own" (Morse 56). Essential1y, "an ideology of 
objectivity or impartiality transformed what were at one time reports fr{)m and for 
particular interest groups into 'objective reports' addressed to the general public 
and accepted as general knowledge" (Morse 56). What is important here is that 
this "transformation" was not simply undergone by a handful of newsmen. The 
historical shift from "subjective" journalism to "objective" journalism was 
undertaken by the entire news discourse {Mores 57). "rhese new mandates 
pushed a different set of responsibilities onto the night~y news anchor. No longer 
an authority figure, the role of the evening news star became that of a mediator 
and go-between; from his desk the newsman -directs our vision and dictates what 
news is important (Morse 57). The "shift" from subjective 10urnalism to objective 
journalism was, in part, prompted by changes in technology. Today, it is easy to 
see how the expansion of telecommunications networks has replaced some of 
the authority and responsibility given to an anchor. Rather than having an 
anchor's description of a news story, we are shown the news event as it unfolds 
in real-time. But this too plays a role within the modern day televised news 
discourse. Today, reporters and anchors are accelerated through ,the ranks for 
how they look on camera as much as for their rigour and journalistic integrity. 
Instead of the vision of the trusted, cantankerous newsman we are left with an 
infinite number of interchangeable talking heads, whose only responsibility is to 
sit and face the camera. 
This shift in authority chang.ed the role of the news anchor. To put it 
bluntly, it is almost as if the anchor has been transformed from orator and 
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commentator, to a blank, anonymous interface through which information and 
news are channelled (Morse 60). Crucial to this new r.elationship, is the 
appearance of the anchor in front of the -camera. While it may appear 
rudimentary, the gaze of the televised news personality p1ays a crucial role in 
establishing his credibility. The anchor addresses the aud~nce at a personal 
level (Morse 60). He appears at the center of the camera's frame and speaks 
directly through the lens, and into the audience's homes. Through the magic of 
television, what the news anchor "r-ecreates on the impersonal television screen 
is the first order of social reatity, the face-to-face situation" {Morse 60). As Morse 
explains, the recreation of the "face-to-face" relationship between the news 
anchor and audience "seems more real than objective news stories," and thus 
reinforces the authority of the network {Morse 61). What is created is a false 
interaction between viewer and anchor - one that serves to maintain the illusion 
of the news as a personal and subjective experience. 
Morse's sentiments are echoed by author, John Hartley. In "Horne help for 
populist politics," Hartley describes the importance of eye contact in a televised 
news broadcast. "Television news," writes Hartley, "exploits one of the most 
distinctive features of the TV in general, namely the -representation of people, 
and in particular of people's faces, expressive featur.es and eyes, in the process 
of narration" (Hartley 76). But what separates the televised news broadcast fmm 
other media is the anchor's posture in front of the camera. Where other actors 
appear unaware of the camera, feigning as if there was no distinction between 
television and their lived experience, the news anchor addresses the 
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camera/viewer dir.ecUy. "Thus," writes Hartley, "without verbalizing it, te!evision 
news operates on a first person {I) to second person (you) axis, in the form of the 
newsreader's relation to the viewer via direct address and eye-contact" (Hartley 
76). This mode of address establishes a complex relationship between the 
reporter (narrator), the viewer {audience) and the subject of the particular story. 
From this position the anchor Of reporter has the power to cast the subject as 
either "we" or "they" (Hartley 77). The news anchor then has the power to frame 
the subject as either part of the whole, "we," and thus worthy of sympathy and 
support, or they are made outcast - a potential threat to the status quo. The news 
anchor can accomplish this without verbal intrusion. As Hart~eydescribes, ".ey.e-
contact alone establishes an I/you axis between newsreader and viewer, wahout, 
apparently, any unwanted editorializing intervention" (Hartley 77). This is to say, 
despite the news' best effort to remain impartial; the news anchor is an active 
participant in the politics of sensemaking. 
The real trick, however, is not the fact that the news anchor is 'Positioned 
in a "face-to-face" relationship, but in the illusion of the "face-to-face" 
conversation. The conversation between news anchor and audience member is 
always a one-way flow of information. As Morse explains, "there is no actual 
feedback, and no recognition of the immediate experience or concerns of the 
viewer - reciprocity is impossible" (Morse 61 ). The news anchor is ther-efore 
always presented as an authority figure speaking down to the audience. This 
phenomenon is also aided by the carefully constructed and discursively unified 
style of speech that is rehearsed by the news anchor. 
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As explained by Morse, the news anchor addresses the camera tn a 
"heightened 'news voice'" which "clouds the distinction between the newscaster 
in his official role as reporter and the newscaster as a person who speaks the 
news" (Morse 62). The end result is that the "newscaster seems to 'know' the 
news in the sense of personal knowledge" (Morse 62). This is, of >course, 
impossible. The news is read and rehearsed from a teleprompt-er in the same 
way that actors are fed lines for sitcoms, or when delivering monologues on a 
late night television program. What we are left with is a system in which the news 
anchor speaks and appears informed; all the while the teieprompter r-emains 
invisible. In such a scenario the true driving force behind the evening newscast is 
the teleprompter. All the machine is lacking is a charismatic and attractive 
persona through which to deliver the news. Similarly, the drudge can be replaced 
but the teleprompter can not. Without the teleprompter the news anchor becomes 
powerless - speechless. Ultimately this begs the question of who, or what, is 
really the anchor that keeps the news from going astray - is it the anchor himself 
or the technology that empowers him? 
Not unlike the heightened news voice of the evening news star, the 
aesthetic construction of the newsroom plays an important role "in maintaining the 
legitimacy of the news. Each item that appears in front of the camera has been 
carefully positioned to convey information relative to a specific narrative, and to 
relate a coherency between the aural, textual and the visual elements of a news 
story. Ultimately, the convergence between these elements functions to 
discourage objection and disagreement by the audience by making them appear 
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more real than real (Morse 70). As Morse writes, the images, video segues, 
voiceovers, and "hanging box inserts" which appear over the anchor's J,eft or right 
shoulder are "positioned like a thought balloon in the comics and appears in 
conjunction with his narration like a visual realization of his thoughts" (Morse 70). 
Often times, the textual and symbolic components of a newscast will mirror the 
speech of the news anchor, verbatim. While this may seem redundant, the 
repetition of information across multiple orders acts as simuUaneous 
reinforcement of the newscaster's authority as an expert. 
The end result is that any remaining subjectivity on the part of the anchor 
is suppressed through this spectacular convergence of sight and sound. 
Information is no longer presented by a lone voice, but is instead the end product 
of an entire news team. It becomes generally accepted that the aesthetic tropes 
of the newsroom could not be possible without the efforts of a variety of behind-
the-scene actors. The invisible teleprompter, the unseen scriptwriter, the camera 
operator, the television director, the animation supervisor et cetera, are all made 
visible, in one form or another, through the immaculate presentation of a national 
broadcast. As Joyce Nelson writes, the news "like no other TV genre brings 
together such a range of technological competence ... The network news show ~s 
essentially a showcase for the latest in electronics hardware and a ce1ebration of 
television itself' (Nelson 98). This makes the news' claim to objectivity that much 
easier to digest, because the role of the subjective anchor is reduced to that of a 
"drudge" - a mere "enunciator" of the nightly news. Here again, what becomes 
essential to the success of the nightly news is not the people involved in its 
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production but its construction and the speed of 1:he techootogy that makes it aU 
possible. 
Through the magic of television the evening news star transforms what 
were once r.egarded as reports from and for specific interests groups into general 
knowledge (Morse '56). The events depicted by the nightly news ar€ not 
necessarily perceived as one of many possibte accounts of what happened, but 
simply as an unfiltered window into the event. Within the news discourse, the 
camera lens has come to replace our coHective vision of world events, and the 
news anchor himseU has been>charged with conveying, not interpreting, reality to 
us. As Morse reminds us, what we have witnessed is the br.eakdown of the news 
as an institution comprised of opinions and persons. Today, it seems that the 
"news" has become a universal package, an aesthetic, which can be copied, 
mimicked, and inserted anywhere in the world. It is in this way that the news has 
been broken down as a site of confinement only to be built up again as a network 
of control. 
Gate Keeping - The Media as intellectual contraceptive. 
Within contemporary society, maintaining a cohesive front is an 
insuperable aspect of control. As the US Administration is well aware, if ther.e is 
dissent or dissonance from wHhin the~r ranks, maintaining hegemonic -control 
becomes nearly impossible. This is especiaUy true during times.of war. Over the 
past fifty years, the perception of war and the perception of wortd events have 
proven to be the deciding factor in whether or not the military will be sucvessful 
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overseas. To paraphrase Louw, if nothing efse, following Vietnam, the US military 
learned that if it could not win the hearts and minds of the American public it 
could not hope to win overseas (Louw 175). It seems that wars are won and lost 
on the nightly news. Unless the reports being sent home from the front coincide 
with the rhetoric being espoused by the Administration, the news becomes the 
site for social dissonance and disruption. As Louw writes, "television images 
have the capacity to promote an anti-war consciousness and to disrupt the 
legitimacy of using coercion" (Louw 175). "Furthermore," continues Louw, "if a 
war was not carefully Public Relation-ized, television images of the war have the 
capacity to seriously destabilize the legitimacy of hegemonic orders" (Louw 175). 
This control is not usually achieved through direct coercion or firings, but is 
instead controlled at the administrative, functional and practical ~evels of the 
news discourse. Through constant observance of these three areas, control and 
dominance are maintained by creating a series of interchangeable and 
interlocking gatekeepers at nearly every level of news production. In this section I 
hope to dismantle the assumption that the news is an objective communication 
form; I will show how the many built-in complexities and the bureaucratization of 
the newsroom have enabled external forces to exert direct control over what 
appears on the news and how information within the news is framed. 
Even before you ,enter the newsr{)om and begin to deal with the red ,tape 
and editorial pressures that exist within, there are several societal gatekeepers in 
place to ensure that the status quo of the news is upheld. First and foremost the 
news is a business. Like any cultural product within capitalist society, the news is 
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about making money and ensuring that the coRditions that allowed them to make 
money today exist in the future. Thus, there are certain material constra1nts 
imposed on newsmen before they even begin to cover an event. This issue was 
touched on by author, Robert Jensen, in his essay, "The Sport of Business/the 
Business of Sport." In his ,essay, Jensen addresses the conservative claim that 
the American news media are anti-business. For Jensen, this is an "odd claim, 
given that the news media are themselves corporations" (Jensen 29). This 
argument, according to Jensen, has more .to do with political rhetoric and 
grandstanding than facts because it fails to explain "why the people who own the 
American media would hire and promote employees who have dedicated 
themselves to the destruction of the system that enriches them" (Jensen 29). The 
presence of leftwing viewpoints within the newsroom seems to have more to do 
with creating and maintaining the illusion of unbiased and fair reporting. 
To illustrate his point, Jensen draws a comparison between sports 
analysts and business journalists. Sports journa~ists, according to Jensen, can be 
"among the most vicious in a newsroom, relentless~y going after their targets -
including the rich and powerful- with venom and {llee" (Jensen 30). They hold 
nothing back as they lay waste to the reputation and abi1ihes of various 'Sport 
professionals, and yet, no one would claim that a sports journalist was anti-sport. 
The men and women who cover the sports section love sport. They have 
dedicated the entirety of their professional lives to the coverage and enrichment 
of the discourse. And yet, if a business reporter were t{) exercise the same level 
of journalistic freedom they would be labelled a communist. It is a strange and 
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hypocritical double standard that has left the news <Jiscourse fractured and 
dishonest. Rather than "challenging rorporate power" and the inherently 
"antidemocratic" nature of .corporations, journalists ar.e left impotent ~Jensen 33). 
But the pressures to make money and abide by the fundamental rules, which 
govern capitalist society are only the tip of the tceberg. Once .nside the 
newsroom, a whole new set of ideological confinements are pJaced on jour{lal~sts 
and newsmen alike. All of which 'Serve to limit oissent and ensure that the 
mechanisms of their reproduction remain intact. Confinement is perhaps not t.he 
best word to .describe what goes 'On inside .of a newsroom. It is true that there ~ a 
strict set of criteria that a journalist or reporter must adhere to, but these criteria 
have been put into place to un-restrict newsmen, not hinder them. The st~e..Qf 
journalistic writing that has been carefully developed over the past forty years 
ensures that there are as few impediments placed on journalists as possible. In 
this way, news reporting has become stream1ined to ensure that the mostrontent 
can be produ.c;ed in the least amount of time. 
Inside the newsroom {whether in the context of a -newspaper orte1evision 
studio), however, there is a completety different set of constraints being -opposed 
on the kinds of reporting that gets done. According to Louw, "newsrooms, as sub-
structures within larger organizations, necessarily conform t.o the practices of 
their host bodies" (Louw 156). This is not to say that the -pressure imposed on the 
newsroom emanates from oirect coercive force {from a manager, editor or 
owner), or from a broader conspiracy ,the government, or other external power). 
Rather, the newsroom, and the practice of newsmaking, is inFluenced in more 
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indirect and insidious manners. As Louw discusses, a key "decision in meanklg-
making sites is choosing who gets promoted{o those positions wher~ staffing 
decision are made ... Ultimately, decision in meaning-making over staffing is 
perhaps the core mechanism for moving meaning-making in a preferred 
direction" (Louw 156). The belief here is that newsroom staffing decisions 
ultimately determine which subjects are promoted and which are shunned by a 
news publication. By hiring like-minded individuals, an 'Owner or editor of a 
particular newspaper/station can ensure that their agenda 'Preva~s. This ~eve1 of 
control exists on nearly every tier of the hiring prooess - board members and 
owners appoint CEOs, who in turn are responsible for hiring managers, editors et 
cetera. This hiring/firing cycle trickles all the way down the line of a news-making 
organization and ensures that a standard of control is maintained year after year. 
Further control is exerted within the newsroom in the form of routinization 
and formatting. As I discussed in the previous section, sustaining a cohesive 
format and aesthetic solidifies a network's iegitimacy by helping to suspend the 
audience's disbelief. But, in addition to a heightened position of authority, 
formatting information into specific norms and modes of transmission ensures a 
degree of power over what st-ories are covered and how they are told. Creating 
news involves sorting through a world's worth of information and 'Phenomena, 
before deciding what is important enough to make it into print. As Louw writes, 
"effectively, journalists are gatekeepers, a"owing some information through the 
gate, but blocking other information" (Louw 15'9). Ultimately, however, the 
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decision-making process has ress to 00 with individual reporters and more to <io 
with institutional standards and formats. 
Because of the routinization of the newsroom, the decisKm over which 
stories to print and which stories to shun is ultimately managed at the 
unconscious level. This discourse of self-censorship manifests itself on two 
planes: the mythological level, and the methodological level. The mythological 
dimension of news routinization tracks its origins to the very foundations of the 
news industry. Going back to the totemic beJief that the news provides an 
uncompromised "window to the world" - this seemingly benign, self-justifying 
piece of rhetoric is, itself, situated within a White-Anglo discouFSe. Thus, the 
"window-to-the-world" model of newsmaking enSUfes that aI/stories are told from 
within a western perspective of 'newsworthiness' (Louw 159). The danger herein 
is the extent to which this model has been adopted and naturalized across the 
globe. The Anglo frame for newsmaking has been implemented into training 
programs that are taught in journalism schoois throughout the world {louw 160). 
Despite minor regional mutations, a remarkably similar news-frame exists 
spanning across social, economic, national and geographical boundaries (Louw 
161). And so, the Anglo-eye for "newsworthiness" has become the giobal 
standard through which the vast majority of news stories are covered. 
Although closely related to the mythological bias -present within the news, 
the methodological confinement of the news manifests itself in very particular 
ways. Once a story's "newsworthiness" has been evaluated by a reporter, his 
methodological choices determine what aspects of the event are important 
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enough to make it into print. As Louw describes, "a process of selection, 
emphasis and de-emphasis" has been routinized around the WWWWWH-
formula ("who" does "what" and "when," "where," "why" and "how" they <:10 it) 
(Louw 160). To paraphrase Louw, the WWWWWH-fDrmula is well suited for 
cause-and-effect style news stories (such as motor accidents, 'fires, and minor 
crimes), but the formula quickly becomes a great hindrance when trying to cover 
stories of a morecompJex nature (such as the reasons fDr engaging in war, 
torture et cetera) (Louw 161). What the WWWWWH-formuladoesdo, is create a 
safe-haven for journalists to stand behind so that they appear objective - "in 
essence, because hard, concrete facts are privileged, the stories acquire a 
'tangibility' and so appear factual' rather than '-constructed'" (Louw 161). The 
methodological pressure to relate all news events to the WWWWWH format is 
immense. So much so that, even those stories which exceed the boundaries of 
the WWWWWH format's comprehension are made to fit within this mould. 
Events such as Haditha and Abu Ghraib, and other stories like them, are 
institutionally stripped of their complexities and made to fit within the hard news 
format of storytelling. What we are usually ~eft with is a dulled down, over-
simplified account of potentially world-shaping events. 
The Anglo-cizing of global news and the routinization of the news format 
ensures that a certain standard of reporting is carried over throughout the entire 
news discourse. But even beyond quality control, the structure of the news 
guarantees that each story is written as efficieotly and objectively as possible. 
Within the newsroom objectivity can mean two very different things. On one 
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hand, objectivity is the marker of journalistic integrity. Objectivity -denotes 
journalistic rigour and a high attention to relating both sides of any story. On the 
other hand, objectivity can also denote the absence of the subject. In this way 
reporters are further alienated from their work. In an ideal scenario, the only 
voice present within a news story would be that of a dividuated, almost machine 
like, universal journalist. In this way the mark of a good journalist lies not in their 
ability to speak passionately about any given story but instead in their ability to 
put aside their individuality and speak objectively. One of the consequences of 
this kind of objective journalism is that newsmen and women often feel no 
attachment to any given story and thus have few incentives to pursue a story 
beyond WWWWWH format. 
It is easy to see the effect that this degree of restriction would have on 
how news is covered. If news stories like Haditha and Abu Ghraib are being 
watered down in order to fit within an outdated narrative format, the issues that 
underlay them are being left out of popular discourse. Abu Ghraib, for example, 
was reduced to a story about individual actions and misdeeds. This repressive 
format did not allow for the larger, systemic problems, which were arguably the 
cause of the scandal, to see the light 'Of day. This is problematic because, in 
reducing far-reaching stories to the bare-bones essence of the ev€nt, 
responsibility is shifted away from the broader socia-political landscape and 
placed solely on individual actors. For example, through the mechanisms of the 
news industry, Lynndie England becomes solely responsible for one of the most 
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damaging news stories to come out of Iraq. 
No Selling Point 
The news is no longer best understood as a site of confinement. Rather, 
its modes of operation and structures have been put in order-to create a system 
of constant, perpetual movement. It is true that the news is inherently -p01iUcal, 
but the politics that dictate the news' "agenda" has less to do with hegemony or 
nationalism, and more to do with thepolitical-.economy<>f ca-pital.ism. Therefore, 
any intersection between the news and poliHcs is best understood in {erms <>f a 
coincidence, or as a treaty of "Convenience, between two forces with similar 
goals. The spotlight on Abu Ghraib was damning to the US Administration, true, 
but in the long run news of the story did little to interrupt the status quo or disrupt 
the flow of global capital. What we are left with then is a series of sensational 
photographs that succeeded in selling newspapers and increasing ratings for the 
broadcast news networks. The absence of coverage,of the Haditha Civilian 
Massacre is perhaps best understood in terms of its saleabHity. All of the 
photographs from Haditha were buried in red tape and legality. The f.ew 
photographs to make it to print regarding Haditha were aerial photographs of the 
surrounding area - there was no blood,guts or gore t<> grab viewers. In other 
words, Haditha was a story without a selling point. 
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Chapter 2: News in the Age of Empire 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I will outline and dev.elop my claim that the news is better 
understood from a Deleuzian post-modernist, empirical -capitaHst model, than it is 
from a Chomsk:ian, propaganda model by focusing more closely on the function 
of war in contemporary soei-ety. I aim to show that war is no longer best 
understood as a conflict between two sovereign nations, but is bet{er understood 
as a series of skirmishes waged aga~nst invisibie combatants and "f.loating" 
enemies. Because war has changed, so too·has the commercial news media and 
the coverage of war. In this way, the news is transformed from a simpl,e tool of 
propaganda by one nation or another, ~nto a much larger symptom of ,global 
empire. It soon becomes apparent that the forces controlling the newsroom have 
little to do with government ,officials, military higher-ups or men in grey flannel 
suits. Rather, it seems that the world's market sets the agendas inside of the 
newsroom. 
To begin I will examine the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. In 
Empire Hardt and Negri argue that sovereignty, as it was {mce understood, has 
been re-imagined in the wake of global network capitalism. ThJs re-imagining has 
brought about a shift in global power and has thus changed war as it was once 
understood. As I will argue, this shift has also fundamentally changed the fde 
that the mainstream news media play in contemporary society. h1the following 
section I will give an overview of the concept of "national heritage" and 
demonstrate how news stories such as the Abu Ghraib Prison Scaooal can 
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interrupt official rhetorics and impact on concepts ofheritage at the individual 
level. This makes managing and Public Relation-izing coverage of such events 
all the more important to world leaders. Finally, I will present a case for·tactics in 
dealing with and moving beyond atrocity. Here I will argue that the US news 
media played an important r{)le in maintaining and Public Relation.,zing both 
scandals in an attempt to limit dissent and public dissonance. In this section I will 
draw connections between how news of the scandals was work€d and reworked 
at both ends of the media spectrum to ensure that the status quo in America was 
maintained, once again ensuring that the now of global capital was left intact. 
War in the Age of Empire 
In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that our concept of 
national sovereignty has been replaced by economics and the principles of free 
exchange {Hardt and Negri xi). As Hardt and Negri write, "ov-er the past several 
decades, as colonial regimes were overthrown and then precipitous~y after the 
Soviet barriers to the capitalist world mar-ket finally collapsed, we have witnessed 
an irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges" 
(Hardt and Negri xi). To paraphrase Hardt and Negri, the ease through which 
goods, technologies and the sites of 'production travel across international 
boundaries has weakened an individual nation's ability to regulate the nows of 
capital within its own bor{jers {Hardt and Negri xi). But this does not mean that 
sovereignty itself has declined, rather, it seems as though "soverei'gnty has taken 
Two War Scandals 49 
a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms 
united under a single logic of rute: Empire" (Hardt and Negri xii). Just as in 
Deleuze's'Society of control, under Empire the only thing universal {s the mar.ket. 
Dne of the.consequences ·<>f €mpir.e is the naturaUzation and routinization 
of war. Today, war is often -symptomatic of one nation''S percepti'On of s'Overeignty 
standing in the way of the flow of global capital. According t'O Hardt and Negri, 
here we have "renewed interest in the concept of bellum just urn, or 'just war'" 
(Hardt and Negri 12). As Har.dt and Negri write, the c'Oncept of a just war has 
"begun to reappear recently as a oentral narrative ofpoiitical discussions, 
particularly in the wake 'Of the first GuU War" {Hardt and Negri 12). No doobt the 
notion of just war was reinvigorated following the events <>f September the 11 ttl. 
"The traditional concept of just war," according to Hardt and Negri, "involves the 
banalization of war and the celebration of it as an ethical instrument" (Hardt and 
Negri 12). War is then perceived as a necessary auxiliary t'O peace while the 
amorphous enemy is transf.ormed into a .perpetual threat that must be beaten 
back at any cost. 
What is interesting about just wars is that they often have n'O end in sight. 
As Hardt and Negri describe in their foH'Ow up t.o Empif.e, Multitude, {here is 
increasingly little difference between outside and inside, between foreign conHkXs 
and homeland security" {Hardt and Negri 14). Hardt and Negri continue, adding, 
"We have thus proceeded fr.om metaphorical and rhetorical invocations of war to 
real wars against indefinite, immaterial enemies" (Hardt and Negri 14). Wars 
such as the "war on drugs" and the "war 'On terror" are wiHlout a -definite, 
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definable enemy and as such can be .empk>yed rhetorically by various groups 
within society. Such wars-can be extended acr.oss the globe, oontinuing fur 
years, decades or even generations {Har.dt and Negri 14). 
The political advantages of waging just wars are innumerabte. The war on 
terrorism, for example, has been ..employed by numerous Administrations around 
the world to justify all matters of selfish and authoritarian ends. Racial profiling 
within global security systems fs now regarded as a necessary evil for keeping 
our malls, streets and airlines safe, suspected terrorists can now,be held in 
custody indefinitely without trial or-char.ge, and asymmetrical warfare, to use 
Hardt and Negri's term, is acceptable so kmg as it is depioyed against the 
enemies of freedom (Hardt 51). 
One could challenge Hardt and Negri's ideas by simplifying America's war 
on terror to a conflict of ideologies between Christians and Muslims. The concept 
of global Empire rears its head· once again when you consider how much money 
is up for grabs in Iraq. In "Baghdad year zero: Pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a 
neocon utopia" Naomi Klein sheds light on what she maintains is America's true 
interest in Iraq. As Klein recounts: 
It was only after I had been in Baghdad for a month that I found what I was 
looking for. I had traveled to Iraq a year after the war began, at the height of 
what should have been a construction boom, but after weeks of searching I 
had not seen a single piece of heavy machinery apart from tanks and 
humvees. Then I saw it: a construction crane. It was big and yellow and 
impressive, and when I caught a glimpse of it around a 'COrner in a busy 
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shopping district I thought that I was finally about to witness some of the 
reconstruction I had heard so much about. But as I got closer I noticed that 
the crane was not actually rebuilding anything-not one of the bombed-out 
government buildings that still lay in rubble all over the dty, nor one of the 
many power lines that remained in tw~sted heaps even as the heat of 
summer was starting to bear down. No, the crane was hoisting a giant 
billboard to the top of a three-story building. SUNBULAH: HONEY 100% 
NATURAL, made in Saudi Arabia. (Klein, 2004) 
According to Klein, Bush's postwar plan for Iraq was not as ill thought out 
as political rivals would have us believe. It seems that Bush's true intentions for 
Iraq were to "layout as much honey as possible, then sit back and wait for the 
flies" (Klein 2004). To paraphrase Klein, Iraq was to become the world's first 
economic utopia - "Every policy that liberates mUltinational corporations to 
pursue their quest for profit would be put into place: a shrunken state, a flexible 
workforce, open borders, minimal taxes, no tariffs, no ownership restrictions ... the 
people of Iraq would, of course, have to endure some short-term pain" (Klein 
2004). Jobs would be lost, state assets would be seized and redistributed, the 
means of nearly every aspect of production would become stripped away and 
sold to an international highest bidder and local business and farmers would 
perish in the wake of global exchange (Klein 2004). "But to the authors of this 
plan," as Klein writes, "these would be small prices to pay for the economic boom 
that would surely explode once the proper conditions were in place, a boom so 
powerful the country wou~d practically rebuild itseif' (Klein 2(04). We are thus 
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given a glimpse into the state of modern war. Waf' is no ionger the .product of 
right versus wrong, a battle between incompatible ideologies or the r.esult of 
aggression between sovereign states - rather it seems that war has .been 
transformed into a means to an end. 
The mainstream t:leWS media then .playa crucial role in facilitating this end 
by maintaining the rhetoric and fayade of 'just' warfare. Without the -constant spin 
and Public Relation-izing of messages .being sent home from the froot and at 
home the system would collapse. It is not-surpr1sing then that stories such as 
Abu Ghraib and the Haditha civilian massacre were met with such controversy. 
News of Abu Ghraib and the Haditha Civilian massacre fundamentally altered the 
story of America's war in Iraq. Troop causalit~es and increasing war-oobt asi~e, 
when the Abu Ghraib story first broke it undermined America's daim to a just 
war. America could no longer take the moral high ground in the war on terror as it 
seemed that America was equaily capable of committing atfocity. To an 
organization based on creating Klein's neo-con-utopia, such an obstacle was 
unacceptable. Thus, strategies of negation were put in place to ensure that the 
damage from Abu Ghraib and Haditha were as minimal as possible. In the 
following section I will present an overview of strategies for-coping with and 
dealing with national atrocity, and demonstrate how stories such as Abu Ghraib 
and Haditha can threaten a nation's war eff'Ort underi:he regime of -capitalist 
empire. 
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An overview of Atrocity 
'Dealing' with the atrocities at Haditha and Abu Ghraib presented an 
interesting set of problems for both journaiists and the American general pubHc. 
In fact, dealing with the tragedies in any way other than {ienial was regarded as 
detrimental to America's war effort, and unpatriotic. For example, iJieasffom 
human rights organizations for full disclosure have been seen as obtrusive and 
unnecessary, while whistle blowers of the tragedies have been ~reat.ed as traitors 
and terrorist sympathizers (Anderson and Morgan 2007). I believe that this is the 
directly related to the fact that these images, and others like them, interrupt and 
promote a contrasting image between the "America" that is presented in the 
popular taught histories, and between what ~s being presented on the news. In 
this way, news of both Abu Ghraib and Haditha interrupts the constructed 
heritage of America. In doing so I hope to demonstrate that heritage is an 
experienced, lived through and discursive force within the western world; one 
that is both constructed on the federal an{i grassroots level. I hope to better 
understand the impact that Abu Ghraib had on the American conscience, and 
offer an explanation as to why Haditha was kept out of circulation. 
Heritage, according to Alan Gordon, is "what is meaningful in our history" 
(Gordon 508). It is a construction - a "happy h1story" that "passes on myths of 
origins and continuation, endowing groups with a sense of purpose" {Gordon 
509). In Dissonant Heritage: the Management of the Past as a Resource in 
Conflict, J.E. Tunbridge and G.J. Ashworth broaden this definition to include 
people's objects d'art and other historical sites including museums, monuments 
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and memoriaJs. But in addition to these sites we also have the concept of 
heritage as being a kind of group, or shar.ed memory. As Tunbridge and 
Ashworth describe, heritage begins to take shape as a form of everyday life-
people's identities and behaviour'can be shaped by their perceptions .of what 
their individual heritag.e may be (Tunbridge and Ashw.orth 1). Heritage can 
therefore bestow a sense of pride and nationalism, and can even be used to 
justify actions that would otherwise seem count.erintuitiv.e. 
The distinction betw.een history and heritage is an important aspect when 
defining heritage. As Tunbridge and Ashworth describe, "history assumes th.e 
existence of episodes from the past in much the way as geography assumes the 
existence of places that can be described, however imperfectly, as really existing 
even if not directly experienced by the narrator" (Tunbridge and Ashworth 6). 
History then attempts to show us how the past really was. Heritage, on the other 
hand, presents the past in a much 'less refined manner .(Tunbridge and Ashworth 
6). Heritage gives us an essentialist vision of the past in order to shape our 
collective eye; it borrows from differ.ent historical events to create a nostalgic, and 
often falsely positive depiction of past events (Tunbridge and Ashworth 6). 
Heritage is then, history as it was meant to be; or rather, history as it was meant 
to be remembered. 
The concept of heritage, particu~arly in postcolonial societies such as 
Canada, America and Great Britain, is inherently controversial in that it att.empts 
to create an image of the present on the back of a clouded and inaccurate 
representation of th.e past {Tunbridge and Ashworth '6). In doing so, certain 
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groups are inevitably left off a nation's heritage map. Britain''S Afro-Caribbean 
and Indian populations, for example, have a long history within Britain; they have 
contributed innumerable objects d'art within Britain's cultural production sites, 
and yet are still virtually invisible within Britain's popular heritage sites. Similarly, 
Canada has had difficulty negotiating certain aspects of its Aboriginal people's 
histories into its popular heritage sit.es. The l€gacy of segregation, ,exdusion and 
attempts at assimilation left by white Canada has made confronting aspects of 
Canada's past difficult to incorporate into its multiculturalist, 'social imaginary. 
Such realties can create fissures and incongruities within a group's sense of 
collective identity, and confronting these discrepancies can Jead to what 
Tunbridge and Ashworth describe as "heritage dissonance." 
Heritage dissonance occurs when aspects of a group's past contradict the 
social imaginary maintained by said group's heritage (Tunbridge and Ashworth 
20). In their examination, Tunbridge and Ashworth envision our sense of heritage 
and its link to identity as a kind of musical equilibrium (Tunbridge and Ashworth 
20). To better explain this analogy, Tunbridge and Ashworth ask ,us to imagine 
heritage as a sustained harmony, which envelops the whole of society 
(Tunbridge and Ashworth 20). Dissident aspects from the past, ,or negative 
realities that may emerge in the news or in our everyday lived ,experiences, 
function to disrupt this harmony by creating contrasting notes, gaps and pit.ches. 
If left unchecked, these discrepancies can create "cognitive dissonance" 
(Tunbridge and Ashworth 20). And so, the role of heritage is to maintain this 
harmony - "its management a+so implies that 'steps will be taken in the direction 
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of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference'" (Tunbridge and 
Ashworth 20). According to Tunbridge and Ashworth, even 'On the smallest level, 
we can postulate an "individual's reaction to levels of heritage dissonance by 
behaviour designed to return to an acceptable level of incongruity" (Tunbridge 
and Ashworth 2D). Under this model, people are actively involved in negating 
aspects of reality in order to maintain a coherent constfuction of both their 
heritage and identity. Strate.gies of negation are paramount during times of war, 
especially when one's own nation is actively involved in what Hardt and Negri 
referred to as "asymmetrical warfare" {Hardt and Negri 51). TheparaHels 
between heritage and propaganda are astounding. From Tunbridge and 
Ashworth's description, the maintenance of a harmonious vision of heritage, like 
control, requires constant maintenance,editing, and a prolonged expression of 
suspended disbelief. Through this definition, heritage appears as more a form of 
overt social control than it does a people, a history, or a sense of national pride. It 
is no wonder the stakes involved in maintaining such harmony are so high. 
The Management of Heritage in the Face of Past and Present Atrocity 
The need to manage dissonant aspects of a state or social group's past 
can result in some very distinct coping mechanisms. As Tunbridge and Ashworth 
describe, in negotiating past atrocities, "the reactions of those who suffered and 
those who were to blame, together with the rest of humanity who might under 
different circumstances have fallen into either category, are complex" (Tunbridge 
and Ashworth 95). "Furthermore," continue Tunbridge and Ashworth, "highly 
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charged controversy with respect to the identity 'Of both victims and perpetrators 
-creates a heritage dissonance prob1em without parallel and any attempt to 
resolve it can have profoundly unsettling ... political consequences" (Tunbridge 
and Ashworth 95). As I alluded to earlier, the politics invo1ved in legitimating 
asymmetrical warfare are astounding. Asymmetrical warfare occurs when one 
nation's resources and military might dwarf that of their enemies (Har~t and Negri 
51). In such cases, the dominant or more advanced nation has to take special 
precautions to ensure that it is not regarded as an unlawful aggressor in both 
foreign and domestic affairs. The recognition of past atrocity can onfy further 
complicate the delicate balance between a just-war and genocide. As Tunbridge 
and Ashworth describe, "since it is better to perceive oneself a victim than a 
perpetrator it is unsurprising that the management of victimization may tend 
towards its inflation and that of perpetration its denial" (Tunbridge and Ashworth 
108). One obvious group strategy for ,coping with this is "deliberate coHective 
amnesia" - "the events are ignored in official taught histories and public 
commemoration and a popular consensus is encouraged that regards the events 
as too distant and too irrelevant to more pressing curr8nt concerns" (Tunbridge 
and Ashworth 108). In a case like Abu Ghraib, it was far beUer for the American 
conscience to move beyond the scandal, and to forget. 
This tendency manifested itself in several different ways. Both official and 
unofficial actions taken by the US military to address the scandal involved 
punishing anyone who talked about the scandal, or who may have 'leaked 
information regarding the extent -of the atrocities that had taken place in Abu 
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Ghraib. Joe Darby, for example, was the first person tol€a:kthe Abu Ghraib story 
to the press. Darby, who was staUoned at the now infamous prison, wanted 
nothing but to send pictures of landscapes and other scenic images hameta his 
wife and family. In order to find suitable p.ctures, Darby approached Charles 
Graner, a prison guard, who had gained the reputation as somewhat of a shutter-
bug amongst his pe-ers (Anderson and Morgan 2007). Graner unknowingly 
handed a disc containing both the shots Darby was looking for and the now 
infamous photos. In an interview with Anderson Cooper, Darby professed that he 
was shocked by what he saw, and quickly made copies of the discs (Anderson 
and Morgan 2007). Once the photos made it to the major news networks, 
Darby's life changed forever. Since releasing the photos, Darby has received 
several death threats from both soldiers and his neighbours. Soon after the 
scandal a vigil was held in Darby's hometown for the Soldiers from his unit, 
including the accused, but not, however, for Darby (Anderson and Morgan 2007). 
As Darby explains, "These were people who knew me since I was born ... These 
were people who were my parents' friends, my grandparents' friends that turned 
against me" (Anderson and Morgan 2007). The backlash from his testimony 
forced Darby and his wife to move from their hometown, and made it neoessary 
for them to be accompanied by an armed guard. Despite being awarded the 
"Profile of Courage" from Senator Ted Kennedy, and being commended by 
officials for speaking out against his peers, Darby, to a large extent, has been 
treated as a coward and a traitor by the nation. 
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The second piece of evidence we have for the United States attempting to 
implement systematic, collective amnesia, is in its legal responses to the photos, 
themselves. Before the scandal even hit the newsstands, attempts were made by 
the government to prevent the disseminabon of the photos by blocking their 
publication and by making it illegal to publish any photos detailing evidence of 
American-lead torture (de Sola 2006). It was not until the American Civil Liberties 
Union filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the state department, 
that the full body of images were released into the pubHc sphere. According to 
David de Sola, a reporter for CNN, the "lawsuit has resulted in the release of 
more than 90,000 pages of government documents on issues of detainee 
treatment in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba" (de Sola 2006). The court's decision was prompted because publication of 
the photographs was viewed as being "central to the purposes of [the Freedom of 
Information Act] because they initiate debate, not only about the improper and 
unlawful conduct of American soldiers, 'rogue' sol'diers, as they have been 
characterized, but also about other important questions as well" (de Sola 2006). 
Even after Abu Ghraib became a household name, the United States military 
took every action possible to stop people from discussing the prison and to 
punish anyone that did. 
As recently as August 2007, Lt. Col. 'Steven L. Jordon, a senior officer 
stationed in Abu Ghraib, was in the news. Lt. Col. Jordon was acquitted on 
charges of failing to control US soldiers who abused detainees at Abu Ghraib, 
but was found guilty of disobeying an order -not to discuss the scandal during a 
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military run inv.estigation. Although the circumstances for Lt. Col. Jordan's 
acquittal are open for appeal, the fact that he was found guilty for tal'king about 
Abu Ghraib is of sp.ecial interest. Like Darby, U. Col. Jordon was attempting to 
right a wrong within the walls of Abu Ghraib and was subsequently punished for 
doing so. 
After the scandal at Abu Ghraib became public knowledge, the Military's 
attention turned away from suppressing the story and onto scapegoating 
responsibility away from the broader socio-political, socio-cultural circumstances 
that undercut the scandal. As a result, the individual actors stationed at Abu 
Ghraib soon had their heads placed on the public's guillotine. As Tunbridge and 
Ashworth write, "if collective amnesia fails and complicity in past atrocity must be 
confronted there are two logically contradictory, management strategies possible" 
(Tunbridge and Ashworth 109). The first seeks to limit blame, by expanding the 
blanket of responsibility as wide as possible (Tunbridge and Ashworth 109). The 
idea herein is that if everyone is guilty then no one can be blamed. The danger 
with this strategy is that it offers little in the way of reparations. As Tunbridge and 
Ashworth describe, "if unseen and uncontrollabl·e external forces can be invoked 
all individual morality can be reduced to automatic, and thus individually 
blameless, reactions" (Tunbridge and Ashworth 110). This strategy would not 
have sufficed for dealing with Abu Ghraib or Haditha because broadening the 
circle of blame for the atrocities was counter intuitive to the war story both the 
media and the Bush Administration were trying to spin. Furthermore, any attempt 
to dilute guilt would have only lead to further dissonance and further criticisms of 
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the Bush Administration; accepting blame wou~d only exasperate the alr-eady taut 
politically environment. 
The second def-ensive strategy for coping with atrocity is to aUempt to limit 
the blame to one specific group, thereby -exonerating the rest of society 
(Tunbridge and Ashworth 110). As Tunbridge and Ashworth describe, "this can 
be a highly successful strategy if such a guilty group can be ·found, fixed in the 
popular imagination and then distanced and disowned by present society" 
(Tunbridge and Ashworth 110). This is the strategy that is most evident in the 
management of Abu Ghraib. After the scandal from Abu Ghraib, both the Bush 
Administration and the mainstream media attempted to limit the guilt by isolating 
the soldiers stationed in Iraq as soleiy responsible for the crimes that were 
committed. Charles Graner, Lynndie England, Sabrina Harman and Lt. Col. 
Steven L. Jordan have been among the few names to be released following the 
scandal at Abu Ghraib. Despite reports by multiple panels and investigative 
committees, all of which have pointed to the fact that Abu Ghraib was the 
responsibility of both the soldiers stationed on the ground and of bureaucrats in 
Washington , only the soldiers have been publicly ostracized. James Schlesinger, 
for example, was appointed by former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, 
to head-up a four person advisory panel to investigate what went wrong in Abu 
Ghraib. Within Schlesinger's 126-page report he clearly identified that "there is 
institutional and personal responsibility right up the chain of command as far as 
Washington is concerned" (CNN.com, August 25, .2004). Schtesinger's 
sentiments were echoed by former Republican Representative and a panel 
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member who was once a senior member of the House Armed Services 
Committee, Tillie K. Fowler, who said, "We found fundamental failures throughout 
all levels of command, from the soldiers on the ground to Central Command and 
to the Pentagon" (CNN.com, August 25,2004). "These failur,es of leadership," 
continues Fowler, "helped to set the conditions which allowed for the abusive 
practices to take place" (CNN.com, August 25, 2004). Despite these reports, the 
only official action taken to resolve the issues at Abu Ghraib was directed against 
soldiers like Lynndie England, Charles Graner, and the ten other defendants at 
the center of the scandal. Sgt. Michael J. Smith, for example, was found guilty of 
using a military dog to terrorize detainees at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. 8gt. Smith 
was sentenced to 179 days in prison, demoted to private, and had his salary 
reduced by $750 USD for three months, making his paycheck about $1523 USD 
per month (Courson 2006). Smith was charged with using his canine, Marco, to 
terrify prisoners - "allegedly for amusement and in competition with other 
soldiers" (Courson 2006). Although Smith's crimes were heinous, his sent.encing 
does little to address the conditions that led to the scandal at Abu Ghraib. 
In identifying a small contingent of soidiers that could be named, blamed, 
and held accountable for the entirety of the misdeeds at Abu Ghraib, the US 
government effectively situated the crimes at Abu Ghraib in the past. By limiting 
their quest for justice within the walls .of Abu Ghraib, the Bush Administration 
effectively exonerated itself from any potential backlash. Furthermore, it ,enabled 
them to appear shocked at the goings-on, and misdeeds of their own 'Soldiers, 
who were, after all, only following orders. As Tunbridge and Ashworth describe, 
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"the danger of demonization is of course that it fai,ls to recognise the causes of 
specific atrocities, and more broadly dehumanization fai~s to acknowledge the 
human flaws that cause such events and thus makes their repetition more likely" 
(Tunbridge and Ashowrth 110). This is to say that by not dealing with the problem 
head on, people -essentially doom themselves to relive past mistakes. 
The news' treatment of the soldiers from Abu Ghraib coincided nearly 
perfectly with those of the military's internal investigations and ,legal actions. 
Within just a few short months of the Abu Ghraib's initial leak, the story was 
dropped from public circulation. Instead of being used as evidence {)f a war 
fought wrong, any and all publication of the now infamous photos was seen as 
being in poor taste or, even worse, treason. But, because of the cyclical cycle in 
which news and information traversed the American public sphere, it has become 
difficult to determine whether or not the news' response to Abu Ghraib was 
reflexive of broader American sentiments, or if it was responsible for shaping 
them. This begs the question of whether or not the suppression of the Haditha 
civilian massacre occurred because of the invested interests of the news elite, or 
whether or not it was the work of the collective unconscious of everyday America. 
Populist Narratives within Elite Media 
The correlation and simultaneity in response to the news of ,the Abu 
Ghraib Prison Scandal between the news elite and the general populaoe in 
America suggests that there is more to the news than being a hierar<;hical, top-
down, propaganda machine. It is true that the news elite are able to maintain a 
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monopoly of vision over the general populace by deciding newsworthiness and 
agenda setting et cetera, but this does not necessarily mean that the evening 
news is totally separate from the general popu1aUon. Rather, it seems that the 
news, however monolithic it may appear, is susceptible to the same fears and 
desires as are the people who make, report, sponsor and watch the evening 
news. I believe that this is precisely due to the fact that the news is run by the 
same fears and anxieties that affect everybody: financial fears, fear of job loss et 
cetera. Global capitalist empire has saturated nearly every facet of day to day 
life. This saturation has become so total that the lines between commerce and 
the free market are now virtually indistinguishable from daily life and thus bleed 
into people's personal lives, opinions and experiences. 
Cases such as the persecution of whistle-blowers at both the organization 
and grass roots level suggest that there is more at play here than stringent 
hegemonic dominance of the media elite over the general population. Instead, it 
seems as though the whole of the American experience has been conditioned to 
forget and move beyond tragedy. It seems as though the quintessential 
motivation for unpacking the tragedies were to manage and create ·discourse 
about them only in the most superficial of ways. The end results are two 
sensational news stories, presented as if they were happening somewhere else, 
outside of America. The men and women at the center of the controversy were 
not representative of America's armed forces, nor the general population, but 
were instead "just a couple bad apples" within the otherwise unblemished bushel. 
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Chapter 3: Trojans and Wrenches 
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Trojans and Wrenches 
As we move deeper and deeper into contml, access to r..esistance seems 
to become increasingly convoluted. The -tools of resistance that are availabl·e to 
the individual are becoming mor.e engrained within -the syst.em they are 
attempting to subvert. We have seen this before - tactics of resistance almost 
involve the re-authoring of various cultural products and tex-ts (de Cert.eau 30). 
But never before have the tactics of resistance so closely resembled those of the 
dominant order. According to Deleuze, the weapons of resistance 'have always 
changed to fit within their era {Deleuze 175). Day by day, as we move towards 
control we are slowly seeing new forms of resistance emerge. "It's true that, even 
before control societies are fully in place," writes Deleuze, "forms of delinquency 
or resistance are also appearing" (Deleuze 11'5). "Computer Piracy and viruses," 
notes Oeleuze, "will replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called 
'sabotage'" (Deleuze 175). This is to say that Tmjans and malware will become 
the wrenches and bricks of the 21 st Century. 
At the same time we ar.e witnessing the emergence of a new trend that 
has never before been available. Just as corporations have seized power by 
becoming rhizomatic6 , so too have resistance ·groups. The Internet has provided 
minority voices with a fabulous new tool to compete with -those of the majority. 
Blogs, eZines, global petitions and piracy are proving to be some of the most 
effective weapons for disrupting the new global order. For the first -time, 
6 Deleuze and Guattari use the term rhizomatic to describe spaces, structures and theories which have 
multiple points of entry and exit. Within a rhizomatic structure power is dispersed horizontally rather than 
vertically, allowing multiple users or players to exert control or dominance simultaneously_ 
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messages that seep through the cracks of the mainstream med~a have a ~atform 
to stand on and be reborn within the subordinate dasses. 
In this chapter I will give an overview of some of the .circumstances that 
have dotted the media's emerg·ence within the 'Society of control. Starting with 
deregulation, I will move through the amalgamation between the military, the 
news and cultural production before finally settling on moments of triumph by 
global minorities. 
Deregulating the World 
During the Thatcher/Reagan era, conglomeration between the world's 
largest media empires began (Louw 91). As Eric Louw describes, both 
"Thatcherism and Reaganism promoted a winding back of Keynesian state 
interventionism and a return to laissez-faire market regulation" (Louw 91). The 
belief herein was that the market-driven, commerdalization of the public sphere 
could only promote "choice" and "consumer sovereignty" over media content 
(Louw 91). According to Louw, "the argument was that med1a operating 
according to commercial principles were compelled to deliver the products 
demanded by audiences, or face bankruptcy" (Louw <91 ). But this view was hardly 
universally agreed upon. Arguments from the left contended that such a shift 
would only serve to further alienate the public from cultural production sites, and 
that a turn to commercialization would limit access to social minorities and other 
marginalized groups (Louw 92). Instead of aiding the public sphere, the 
commercialization of media centers could only limit debate and participation. 
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The concept of the "public sphere" was first introduced by Jur'f)en 
Habermas. According to Habermas, the "public sphere is a sophere whioh 
mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the 
bearer of public opinion, accords with the principJe of the public sphere - that 
principle of public information which on.ce had to be fought for against the arcane 
policies of monarchies and which since that time has made possible the 
democratic control of state activities" (Habermas 50). In his writings, Habermas is 
nostalgic for the German/French press in which, "the bourgeoisie/burgers used 
the new Gutenberg-inspired media to further their interests and mobilize against 
the then ruling feudal elite" -(Louw 93). The result of this alliance was a print-
mediated public sphere that stretched from Germany to France, and finally to 
England - this served to produce a relatively dense network of public 
communication, which, according to Habermas, eventually manifested itself into 
a counter-hegemonic force (Habermas 423). Today, Habermas' public sphere is 
little more than a dream. Despite the fluidity and speed with which information is 
capable of traveling, and despite the vast networks and infrastructure for creating 
and distributing new media content that are readily available, Habermas' dream 
of a space for the democratic exchange of ideas and information appears 
squashed beneath the monolithic power of the laissez-faire, capitalist-driven 
media giants. 
In the previous chapters we have discussed what can essentially be 
referred to as the fundamental problems and assumptions underlying the 
mainstream news media. Particularly in the case of the .televised flews media, 
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the problem with the news is that it reflects the interests -of a select few, all the 
while carrying the banner of being a clear, objective, and unbiased account of 
world events. As I demonstrated in chapter one, this.claim, and others like them, 
is fallacious. Like all other capitaltst-driven organizations, the news is primarily 
driven by profit and is therefore subject to the same kind of interference and 
ideological dominance as any other business (Louw 7). As a result, the populist 
vision of a cantankerous old news hound, relentlessly chasing a news story 
becomes further and further removed from reality. Today, it seems that the 
newsroom is organized around sensationalism and ratings, rather than 
journalistic integrity or ethics. Alas, this reality seems far more total when you 
consider the effects that conglomeration and concentration have had on the 
world's mediascapes. As I touched on in chapter one, mergers between the 
media-rich have only consolidated control over every idea and product that is 
circulated within the mass forum. 
Before I go too far I feel that it is prudent to give some grounds to ·some of 
the obstacles that the alterative press faces. It is not simply a matter of taking 
action or even lobbying for more open-ended, -democratic access within the 
mainstream media. Since the Thatcher/Reagan era, the idea of participation and 
regulation has, itself, become a counter-hegemonic movement. As discussed in 
chapter one, the merger between RCA and GE ensured that the US military 
would have a controlling interest in one of America's largest broadcasters, NBC 
(Halleck 211). Evidence concerning the US military exerting any d~rect control 
over NBC's programming is subjective at best, but the run-off from the military to 
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RCA, RCA to GE, GE to NBC, and from NBC to children's cereal, has never 
been so direct {Halleck 211). According to Halleck, despite the inor:easingly 
democratic nature of technology {the Internet, of course, being the great leveller), 
sentiments regarding resisting this model and challenging the media €IRe have 
been met with a general feeling of apathy from the all too ~onformist public. "The 
profound alienation and impotence that most people feel about technology," 
writes Halleck, "has overshadowed any embryonic thoughts we might have had 
about the liberatory potential of most machines" (Halleck 213). Instead of using 
these new technolog~es to our advantage, western society has been relativ.ely 
docile when it comes to contributing or, parish the thought, challenging the media 
elite. Almost universally it seems that "everyone but the radical right and the 
corporations have been effectively intimidated" form participating {Halleck 213). 
Because after all, "how can we challenge the media RCAIGE is in charge?" 
(Halleck 213). But these challenges are not in born, in fact, according HaB.eck, 
many of th.ese apathies Df been constructed by the hegemonic and capitalist 
elite. Despite the desire for more democratic media and more democratic 
technologies, people have been conditioned, so to speak, not to resist. 
Halleck gives us an extensive examination of the history of democratic 
media, and demonstrates how apathy and user-passivity have been built-into 
many modern communications devices. For example, the first mass produced 
affordable Kodak camera, the Browni·e, was not packaged with an open-ended, 
apolitical user guide (Halleck 218). Rather, the packaging for the Brownie 
included several advertisements depicting proper use of its camera {documenting 
Two War S-candals 71 
birthdays, holidays and other special occasions). In addition to this visual 
rhetoric, each instruction booklet was -coded with an oddly passive, domestic 
undertone; it seemed that the "domestication of imagery was continuous with the 
domestic fate of women: safe in the home, the kitchen, and occasionally on 
vacation" (Halleck 218). According to Halleck, "in their advertisements and hobby 
books, Eastman Kodak never suggested that Brownie owners take pictures of 
their workplaces, or that they record their rank-and-file strikes" (Hal/.eck 218). 
Again we see a partial paradox for the capitalist, ideological elite: on one hand, 
there is the drive to produce more democratic products and increase sales. 
Personal cameras are especially appetising from an economic standpoint, as 
they tend to encourage repeat consumption in the form of hobbyist magazines, 
additional film, accessories et cetera. On the other hand, home cameras, 
camcorders and personal computers alike, all hold within them the potential to 
erode the capitalist elite's hard-fought ideological constraint and hegemonic 
power. Because after all, if everyone is capable of producing their own histories, 
news and images, the messages presented by the mainstfeam media can 
become diluted amidst a sea of free choice. 
No telecommunications technology encapsulates this duality better or 
more frequently than the Internet. The "frontier" metaphor is perhaps the most 
used, and accurate, description of the free-markel's battle to control, corral and 
contain cyberspace. As in the case of the American west (at least in those 
cinematic Hollywood nostalgic pieces), the first people to lay -claim to the west 
were those mavericks seeking refuge and riches outside of the conformist, 
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hierarchies of the big city. For a time, these pioneers and frontiersman were 
reasonably successful in their venture into the unknown and the unsettled. But 
once the groundwork and familiar infrastructures had been established 
civilization soon found its way into the west, along with annexation, law and 
everything else that capitalism and gov.ernments bring with them in order to 
retain their dominance. This battle for control and dominance can be seen on the 
Internet as we speak. As Michael Strangelove writes, author of Empire of the 
Mind; Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement, "almost immediately after 
business first rushed onto the Internet back in 1993, the call was heard that this 
wired frontier must be civilized" (Strangelove 79). After this initial push, 
Strangelove continues, "'the marketplace,' cried business leaders, will bring order 
to the chaos of cyberspace ... the online audience must be corralled in corporate 
Web sites, eyeballs must be owned, surfing habits 'monetized,' freeloaders 
converted into online subscribers, and piracy reined in once and for all" 
(Strangelove 79). During this initial period, the call to bring the Internet into the 
fold could be heard time and time again (Strangelove 79). "To many," writes 
Strangelove, "it seemed as though an anomaly had appeared within the social 
system, one that had to be normalized or dire consequences would certainly 
unfold" (Strangelove 79). To this end, many from within both the economic and 
academic centers felt that it was only a matter of time before the Internet was 
completely brought to order, commercialized, homogenized and made to fit within 
the broader, more traditional, forms of mercantilism - a theory that has 
commonly come to be known as the "normalization thesis." 
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The "normalization thesis" argues that, over -time, the Internet will 
inevitably come to be dominated by corporate interests and commerce 
(Strangelove 80). According to the normalization thesis, there are three 
immutable signs foreshadowing the hostile takeover of the web. First, there is the 
"oft-repeated assertion" that online culture and life is quickly evolving into a 
straightforward mirror of offline media content and the surrounding commercial 
media system (Strangelove 80). The second sign follows that, as the gap 
between online and offline culture closes, Internet audiences will soon return .to 
the familiar state of relatively passive consumers -{Strangelove 80). Finally, there 
is the distinct belief that online users and audience members have been so 
conditioned by previous media delivery systems that they wish to return to a 
more passive, constrained state (Strangelove 81). However, the transition from 
the Internet as smooth space to striated space? has been more difficult to 
facilitate than spectators and commentators had initially thought. As Strangelove 
writes, "the existence of rampant digital piracy, child pornography, sexual 
predators, hate speech, organized crime, networked terrorist organizations, 
fraud, persistent hacker attacks, identity thieves, prolific virus creators" and, if I 
may add, alternative media outlets, green agitators and dissenting bloggers, is 
proof that the Internet will prove more difficult to castrate, wrangle and brand than 
was hitherto imagined. 
Meme Warriors and Culture Jammers Rejoice Online 
7 In "A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia," Deleuze and Guattari draw a distinction 
between what they call smooth and striated space. Smooth spaces -exist outside of any state or fonnal 
institution, while striated spaces are often seen as being restrictive and sedentary. 
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The disruptive potential of the Internet stems from two mutually r.eliant 
tactics. First, the Internet creates a certain degree of freedom for those looking to 
mobilize and share information across a seemingly infinite number of audience 
members. Secondly, the Internet grants users free access.to the building blocks 
and tools of digital culture jamming. Michael Strangelove ascribes much of this 
potential to the Internet's inherent fluidity of meaning, signs and ideas 
(Strangelove 90). According to Strangelove, the Internet holds a great potential to 
destabilize capitalism's management of the consumer's mind (Strangelove 99). 
"Until the mass adoption of the Internet," writes Strangelove, "consumers had 
very little access to information that was not produced by the economic system, 
and the physical range of their discourse was limited to their local social 
networks" (Strangelove 99). Here again we see strong undertones of Habermas' 
public sphere. To no small extent, the success of capitalism throughout the 20th 
Century owes a great deal to the concentration of ownership over the means of 
communication and the ability to control access to alternative sources of 
knowledge '(Strangelove 99). The Internet then -poses a legitimate threat to 
corporations and governments because the Internet provides the consumer with 
an extensive communication and knowledge resource. Furthermore, the Internet 
provides its subscribers with all of the necessary tools and information to r:esist, 
subvert and challenge mainstream society. For example, in 2003 the word 
"boycott" appeared more than 4,000,000 times across the Internet, ·each one 
calling for the immediate, global boycott of various produots and companies 
(Strangelove lOO). By 2004, the number of times "boycott" appeared had 
Two War Scandals 75 
increased to more than 7,450,000 times {Strangelove 100). According to 
Strangelove, this number represents "substantial consumer dissatisfaction and 
activism" (Strangelove 101). Nike, the Gap, Microsoft, Disney, fox News and 
more, were all in the crosshairs of petitioners and activists iooking to take a stand 
against the spread of global capitalism. But aside from forming petitions and 
crafting online slam magazines against corporations, the web presents activists 
with a far more devastating tool for chipping away at the corporate sector; online 
culture jamming. 
The Internet is not a free .zone. Despite appearanoes, the Internet is 
owned like every other piece of ad space or media property. What makes the 
Internet different is the fact that the web is much more difficu1t to manage. 
Furthermore, unlike older forms of media such as newspapers or television 
stations, the content that appears online can come from anywhere. This means 
that although the Internet is a primarily a tool for and by the media and corporate 
elite, it is a tool that is open and available to everyone with an Internet 
connection. This is perhaps most evident in the ways that trademarked brands 
and faces have been hijacked by a rogues gallery of online activists. 
In many ways, capitalism organizes our lives and our societies along lines 
of products and invented meanings. As Strangelove dtes, "diamond rings would 
not be on the fingers of so many brides if the consumer's mind was not subject to 
powerful methods of persuasion ad socialization" (Strangelove 135). Over the 
past seventy years, this system of persuasion has been protected from ex{ernal 
forces and identity hijackers through various regulatory systems and inteBectual 
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property clauses. As Strangelove writes, "trademark,copyright, and other 
aspects of intellectual property law give corporations extensive rights over the 
meaning and representation of their brands, logos, products, and cor-porate 
identity" (Strangelove 135). For Strangelove, this poses a massive problem within 
consumer culture, as large aspects of individual identity and meaning are focked 
away and protected as private property (Strangelove 135). The Internet offers up 
a platform to dismantle many of these restrictions because it ,expands the 
formerly closed circle of producers and meaning makers. 
Strangelove uses the image and kon of the Barbie Doll to ,em pnas iz€how 
the corporate sector has failed to anticipate the Internet's potential for resistance. 
According to Strangelove, "Barbie's position in the cultural history of the Net 
reveals the extent of the failure to extend property rights and definitional control 
into cyberspace" (Strangelove 137). Barbie is an international cultural icon, with 
sales reaching into the billions of dollars. Much of the success of Barbie has 
hinged on Matters ability to control and manage every aspect of the Barbie 
identity. Perhaps this is why Mattei has taken such exception to any and all 
unauthorized use of Barbie's image or likeness. As Strangelove writes, the illegal 
sail of DIY and appropriated Barbie art over the web has transformed a 
corporation's "pink princess" into the "Sorority Slut Barbie, Hacker Barbie, 
Tourette Syndrome Barbie, Lesbian Bondage Barbie, Gangsta Bitch Barbie, 
Exotic Dancer Barbie, Transgendered Barbie and Barbie on the Cross" 
(Strangelove 138). Mattei has not taken to this unlicensed use of their product 
lightly. Each year Mattei doles out millions in legal fees fighting to regain the reins 
Two War Scancrals 77 
of their wayward brand. However, for every parody w.ebsite or naughty Barbie 
auction that Mattei's lawyers take down, another one springs up in its place 
(Strangelove 138). It is an uphill battle to be sure, but one that prov.es th.e 
disruptive power of the Internet. 
The Internet user's appropriation of the Barbie icon is not unlike the tactics 
of the poor outlined by Michel de Certeau. In "Making Do: Uses and Tactics," 
Michel de Certeau made a distinction between the meaning-making 'schemas of 
the power elite and the subordinate spheres. The primary question {or de 
Certeau is how meaning making is accomplished by ,those without the means to 
produce messages, commodities or laws. According to de Geneau the have-
nots, the subordinate classes, simply make do with what is immediat.ely available 
to them. To illustrate this point de Certeau asks the readers to examine their own 
consumption practices with regards to television. Do television audiences accept 
broadcasts passively or actively? "What," asks de Certeau, "do they make of 
what they 'absorb,' receive, and pay for - what do they do with it?" (de Certeau 
31). The same logic can be applied to all products produced by the dominant 
culture. Do the sub-sets of the parent cultur,epassively accept the meanings 
attached to commodities, or do they attempt to invert this meaning and re-
appropriate them into their subaltern lexicon? We see then that ·different people, 
all occupying the same general '~ocation and who function within the same 
society, can have contrasting sets of meaning and understanding. 
According to de Certeau, society is composed of two sets of meaning 
makers: those who create meaning and those who subv.ert meaning - those who 
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use "strategies" of im~ementation and those who use "tactics" of inversion. De 
Certeau describes "strategy" as the "circulation (or manipulation) of power 
relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power {a 
business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated" -(de Certeau 36). 
A strategy is the implementation of an ideal ·or attitude that functions to maintain 
the status quo and the values and ideals of the parent culture. 
A "tactic," on the other hand, is a "calculated action determined by the 
absence of a power locus" (de Certeau 37). It is the act of deterring prescribed 
meaning, reclaiming culture and challenging the parent culture. An active 
tactician must then "play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the 
law of a foreign power ... A tactic is an art of the weak" '(de Certeau 37). Perhaps 
more so than any other communications medium, the Internet is a soapbox that 
is equally tall for both the rich and the poor. It is easy to see how "strategi.es of 
implementation" could be imposed on the masses by a medium such as 
television or radio, but these strategies seem much more difficuH to plan and 
manage over a medium that is inherently rhizomatic as the Internet. This is not to 
say that the Internet is completely democratic, after all, HTML cod1ng does 
require a certain degree of know-how before ·one can begin coding and posting, 
but the tools of the trade are all online for those looking learn. 
For this reason the Internet has br.eathed new life into Culture Jamming 
and corporate activism. In "Culture Jamming," Klein describes the act of culture 
jamming as "the practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking billboards in 
order to drastically alter their messages" (Klein 230). "Since most residents can't 
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afford to counter corporate messages by purchasing their own ads," they are 
forced into either defacing or decentering the messages produced by the 
dominant order (Klein 230). These defacements ,can take the form of parody, the 
carnivalesque or simple inversion -of meaning. "The most sophisticated culture 
jams," according to Klein, "are those which hack into a corporation's own method 
of communication to send a message starkly at odds with the one that was 
intended" (Klein 232). This act of inversion is a practice which Lasn identified as 
"detournement." 
Similar to Klein's "culture jamming," "detournement" refers to the 
subversion of dominant meaning (Lasn 126). C~assic examples of detournement 
are those which "mimic the look and feel of the target ad, prompting the classic 
double take as viewers realize what they're seeing is in fact the very opposite of 
what they expected" (Lasn 127). Strangelove's "Lesbian Bondage Barbie" is an 
extreme example of this, but many have found less controversial uses for 
detournement. For example, the crystallization of the mainstream news aesthetic 
has all but solidified a style and mode ·of address for those looking to produce 
and disseminate alternative media. In the hands of a talented web designer, the 
messages being produced by independents online are virtually indistinguishable 
from their "legitimate" counterparts. One example, however sensational, is 
theonion.com. The Onion has recently begun producing their own news video 
podcasts, that are available to download fr.ee of charge via their web server. Not 
only are their broadcasts entertaining, they also offer a certain degree of social 
commentary regarding the way news is usually handled and reported. The end 
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result is a -program that not only looks and feels like a r.egular news show butDne 
that could also -pass for legitimate news. 
Online Journalism and the end of Corporate News 
In this final section I hope to outline the value of aitemative news blogs 
and independent news outlets as important agents of change for combating the 
exclusive, anti-democratic mainstream media. I will argue that not-for-profit news 
blogs are inherently anti-heg,emonic because their entire struoture and presence 
is an affront to the ways that news is produced and information is exchanged. As 
I have outlined in previous chapters, a fundamental-problem with the mainstream 
news is that it is non-participatory. From a business perspective, this makes 
perfect sense. From an egalitarian perspective, the consolidation of the media 
couldn't be more harmful. Zero participation translates into fewer voices, fewer 
perspectives and soon the whole of the news media begins to resemble 
Chomsky's propaganda model. 
The online alternative media offer a non-corporate perspective on world 
events. While the structure, aesthetic and style of the alternative media may 
resemble its corporate -counterpart, the voice, perspective and intent have been 
lobbied without fear of censorship of reprimand . As I -discussed in -chapt.er one, 
one of the biggest constraints over corporate journalists is the fear of being 
censored or fired. Once more, within the mainstream news media reprimands 
and heavy censorship are often unnecessary within the news room as 
gatekeeping and selective hiring have helped to ensure -that only like-minded 
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individuals have a chance of making it to screen or -print. Online journalists, on 
the other hand, are free from these -kinds of organizational pressures. Online 
journalists and bloggers answer to no one and are free to report and produce 
unconstrained content. And, with -the war in Iraq now in its seventh year, the 
importance of this fact has never been greater. 
The fact that corporate news is broken and fails to live up to its promise of 
painting an objective, unbiased account of the world is never more apparent than 
during times of war. Strangelove cites Robert McChesney as saying that, "every 
time the United States has gone into a major conflict the media has acted as a 
'superior propaganda organ for militarism and war'" (Strangelove 183). "This 
observation," continues Strangelove, "provides the historical context for the 
events that unfolded in the American media after 9/11" (Strangelove 183). In the 
days that followed September the 11th American journalists were completely 
barred from deviating from the mantra that America is the greatest nation on the 
planet and that their enemies are pure evil (Strangelove 184). As Strangelove 
describes, this fact was made pure and simple during Dan Rather's appearance 
on Larry King Live (Strangelove 184). When asked about the terrorist attacks, 
Rather very plainly told King that "they hate us because they're losers and we are 
winners ... There are just evil people in some places" (Strangelove 184). Rather's 
sentiments, although not always expressed so candidly, were echoed ad 
nauseam throughout the corporate media. It seemed as if the whole of the 
industry was ready and willing to fall in line with Bush's mantra of "if you are not 
with us you are against us". As Strangelove notes, "along with reproducing..elite 
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opinions and ignoring alternative perspectives, the press suspended criticism of 
President Bush" (Strangelove 184). This bias was especially prominent when you 
compared content from CNN World with CNN's domestic content. 
As Strangelove notes, "faced with servifl9 an international audience that 
was hostile to the US -lead war, CNN produced two different version of th.e war: a 
critical one for global audiences and a sugar coated one for Americans" 
(Strangelove 184). One can only speculate about the reasons behind this media 
wide self-censorship, but one common conclusion has been that news ouUets 
were coerced at the organizational level into promoting a rampantly pro-
American sentiment before signing the nation up for a full-scale war. The online 
news community, on the other hand, presented a much more varied depiction of 
the events immediately after the 9/11 attacks. Certainly there were several online 
reiterations of the message being espoused by the mainstream media, but in 
addition to these carbon copies, there were also several personal and accounts 
of the events following the attack. Conspiracy theorists came out in droves 
online, as well as those detailing personal accounts and perspectives of where 
they were when the crisis occurred (Strangelove 18£). Other sites gave a 
platform for people stranded in Airports and in the Manhattan core the 
opportunity to post messages to their loved ones indicating that they were safe 
and unharmed. But the real power of online journalism lay in the speed and 
quantity of the reports that came pouring in. As Strangelove describes, the key 
difference between the Internet and -commercial news was that, following the 
attacks, "all points of view appeared, and instantly" (Strangelove 186). According 
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to Strangelove, "all voices of dissent appeared within the Internet-before they 
were heard in mainstream media" -(Strangelove 186). From the incredibly 
personal to that of the recreational journalist, the Internet offered a platform for all 
opinions regardless of which side of the politicallin.es they fell . 
Since September 2001, a lot has changed in the field of online journalism. 
The number of online blogs and news feeds has grown from the tens {)f 
thousands to the tens of millions, and shows no sign of slowing down. The major 
application of the online not-for-profit news channel isn't that it gives people the 
ability to create and spread information, -or that it grants people access to 
contrasting sources of news and information. The true application of online 
journalism rests in people's ability to interact and give feed back. Unlike the one-
to-many model presented by televised or print media, online news is very much 
an open dialogue. As quickly as material is posted online, there is a venue and 
forum available to reply, comment, add to or challenge what has been posted. 
For this very reason, online journalism is disruptive to the mainstream news 
media. At its very structure, online journalism is set up to be more accountable 
and more participatory. Unlike the televised news, for example, net-news is 
established as a dialogue, rather than a transmission that is to be taken at face 
value. 
Conclusion 
It is hard to imagine cracks and fissur.es within a global, rhizomatic, 
information network but they do exist. Just as in the case of minority views or 
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personal accounts of 9/11 , within a control society whenever something is left out 
of the headlines or too quickly forgotten by the mainstream press there will 
always be host of individuals from around the world ready to pick it up again. Abu 
Ghraib is an obvious case. Soon after news of the story first hit the airwaves 
people from around the world were twisting the imag,es into their own 'forms.of 
resistance. From iRaq {a political play on the iconography used to promote 
iPods) to more poignant sculptures, city murals and digital artwork - the images 
from Abu Ghraib have been used as the raw materials fuelling politics around the 
world (Apel 95). Even more astounding, once these images and articles find a 
home online there is little that can be oone to stop their spread . Websites can be 
shut down and, in extreme cases, hard drives can be seized but there will always 
be mirror sites and viral messages cir-culating to keep minority viewpoints alive. 
Deleuze once said that the brain is the ultimate conduit mediating between the 
Inside and the Outside (Deieuze 176). Ideas are thou-ght before they are ever 
uttered just as ideas have to be spoken before they can become political. Under 
the society of control, I would like to suggest that the Internet, despite its 
shortcomings, has become the new frontier mediating between the interior and 
the exterior. It is the new meeting place for circulating ideas and opinions and 
becoming political. Like all things political, the ideas and subversions that 
materialize online may only appear for a moment, "and it's that moment that 
matters, it's the chance we must seize" (Deleuze 176). And just as in Deleuze's 
musings about the limits of thought and politics, the only limit to this new tool is 
our belief in our ability to make c-hange. 
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We need not look any further than the coverage of the Haditha Civilian 
Massacre and the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal in the online press to see evidence 
of within hours of the Abu Ghraib story first hitting newsstands activ~sts, political 
agitators, bloggers and artists were online giving their own interpretations .of the 
story. The bloggers at antiwar.com, for example, published some of the more 
damning images from the scandal, many of which the American mainstream 
media had otherwise refused to print. The images -published on antiwar.com 
were much more visceral and violent in nature and left very little room for political 
rhetoric or dismantling. Even Senator Inhofe or Rush Limbaugh would have 
found it difficult to dismiss these images as blatant acts of torture. Likewise, in 
the aftermath of the Haditha Civilian Massacre, bloggers and eJournalists rallied 
together to bring the facts about Haditha to life. Truthout.org, for example, 
covered the story to the best of its ability, and even provided readers with a 
forum to leave comments, ask questions, and keep debates about Haditha 
opened to both sides of the American political spectrum. Neither truthout.org or 
antiwar.com come close to matching the resources that CNN, AI Jazeera or Fox 
news have access to, yet the journalistic spirit and rigor that is so sorely missing 
from the international media giants is present and thriving within them. What 
separates these online, grassroots journalists from their mainstream counterparts 
is a willingness to ask questions and seek truths, and the freedom to do so 
without concern for the bottom line. 
What we lack most is a belief in the world, we've quite iost the world, 
it's been taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate 
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events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new 
space-times, however small their surface or volume. It's what you call 
pietas. Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be 
assessed at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a 
people. (Deleuze 176) 
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